Quarterly Report on Inflation (November 2004) by -
QUARTERLY REPORT
ON INFLATION
NOVEMBER 2004
Published by the Magyar Nemzeti Bank
Gábor Missura, Head of Communications Department
1850 Budapest, Szabadság tér 8–9.
www.mnb.hu
ISSN 1585-0161 (print)
ISSN 1418-8716 (online)
Act LVIII of 2001 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, which entered into effect on 13 July 2001, defines the primary objec-
tive of Hungary’s central bank as the achievement and maintenance of price stability. Low inflation allows the econ-
omy to function more effectively. This contributes to better economic growth over time and works to moderate cycli-
cal fluctuations in output and employment.
Using an inflation targeting system, the Bank seeks to attain price stability by implementing a gradual, but firm disin-
flation programme over the course of several years. The Monetary Council, the supreme decision-making body of
the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, performs a comprehensive review of the expected development of inflation every three
months, in order to establish the monetary conditions that are consistent with achieving the inflation target. The
Council’s decision is the result of careful consideration of a wide range of factors. These include an assessment of
prospective economic developments, the inflation outlook, money and capital market trends and risks to stability.
In order to provide the public with a clear insight into the operation of monetary policy and enhance transparency,
the Bank publishes the information available at the time of making its monetary policy decisions. The Quarterly
Report on Inflation presents the forecasts prepared by the Economics Department for inflation and the macroeco-
nomic developments underlying the forecast. The forecasts of the Economics Department are based on certain
assumptions. Hence, in producing its forecast, the Economics Department assumes an unchanged monetary and fis-
cal policy. In respect of economic variables exogenous to monetary policy, the forecasting rules used in previous
issues of the Report are applied.
The analyses in this Report were prepared by the Economics Department staff under the general direction of Ágnes
CSERMELY, Head of Department. The project was managed by Barnabás FERENCZI, Deputy Head of the Economics
Department, together with Attila CSAJBÓK, Head of the Monetary Assessment and Strategy Division, Mihály András
KOVÁCS, Deputy Head of the Conjunctural Assessment and Projections Division, and Zoltán M. JAKAB, Head of the
Model Development Unit. The Report was approved for publication by István HAMECZ, Managing Director.
Primary contributors to this Report also include Zoltán GYENES, Mihály HOFFMANN, Cecilia HORNOK, Gábor
KISS, Gergely KISS, Norbert M. KISS, Mihály András KOVÁCS, Zsolt LOVAS, Gábor ORBÁN, András OSZLAY, Kata-
lin PETÔFI, Gábor PULA, Zoltán SZALAI, Gergely TARDOS and Barnabás VIRÁG. Other contributors to the analyses
and forecasts in this Report include various staff members of the Economics Department and the Monetary
Instruments and Markets Department. Translated by Éva LI, Edit MISKOLCZY, Péter SZÛCS and Éva TAMÁSI.
The Report incorporates valuable input from the MNB’s other departments as well as the Monetary Council’s com-
ments and suggestions following its meetings on 2 and 22 November 2004. However, the projections and policy
considerations reflect the views of the Economics Department staff and do not necessarily reflect those of the
Monetary Council or the MNB.
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OVERVIEW 
Conducive global financial
environment
Stable forint exchange
rate and falling 
short-term yields – 
long-term risks remain
Staff’s forecast is 
conditional on certain
assumptions
Disinflation has started…
… accompanied 
by moderating 
demand-pull 
inflationary pressure
... and wage inflation
Inflation expectations
cooled
GDP growth stabilises
between 3.5–4 per cent
The worldwide economic recovery has so far been associated with low inflation and
official interest rates. Global indicators of risk have also remained at depressed lev-
els. If international economic growth does not falter due to the risks which have aris-
en in the course of the year, the likelihood of leading central banks choosing a faster
track to increasing interest rates will grow.
The forint exchange rate has been fluctuating along an appreciating path, its reac-
tions to adverse fundamental news being slight and brief, which may be explained
by the MNB’s cautious approach to interest rate cuts this year, in addition to the
positive stimuli from the global financial marketplace. The decline in yields at the
short end indicates that the perception of risks related to near-term economic devel-
opments has improved over the past quarter. All of this, however, has not been asso-
ciated with a perceptible improvement in Hungary’s equilibrium indicators – market
participants have remained undecided regarding the convergence path.
The forecast presented in this issue of the Report has been prepared under the
assumption of unchanged monetary conditions, i.e. constant exchange rates and in-
terest rates. In respect of fiscal policy for 2005, we have prepared our forecast on
the basis of the tax legislation already adopted and the 2005 budget bill presented
by the Government to Parliament. For 2006, we assumed that the planned reduc-
tion of 0.6 per cent in deficit would be achieved.
The consumer price index fell to 7 per cent, with core inflation dipping below 6 per
cent according to third-quarter data. This decline was quite widespread, indicating a
robust process of disinflation. The drop in inflation, following its sharp rise due to the
increase in indirect taxes (VAT and excise duties), can be explained by the appreci-
ation of the forint vis-à-vis the euro, more moderate consumption, and a decrease in
inflation expectations, which helped to counterbalance the unbroken strong growth
in unit labour costs.
The growth rate of household consumption has slowed somewhat this year, after ris-
ing strongly in 2002–2003 and, as a consequence, its inflationary impact has been
declining. Although actual data for the second quarter reflect a pick-up in consump-
tion growth, this may be ascribed primarily to transient factors.
Labour market tightness, although still present, has eased somewhat, and the rates
of wage inflation and labour demand growth have slowed. While wage growth still
appears to be high, after allowance for developments in productivity, growth in
labour costs appears to have started tapering off.
According to the latest polls, inflation expectations continued to recede in the peri-
od under review. Households and corporate managers’ perception of inflation also
declined. The survey of inflation prospects, conducted in October, showed that mar-
ket analysts revised down their short-run inflation expectations, but left their forecast
for end-2005 unchanged.
After this year’s brisk investment activity and resulting growth of around 4 per cent,
the rate of economic growth is expected to stabilise in the coming two years. GDP
growth is likely to be between 3.5–4 per cent in 2005 and 2006.
OVERVIEW
…accompanied by 
a slowdown 
in domestic use
… and an improvement 
in the goods balance.
Gradual disinflation
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OVERVIEW  
Modest decline 
in core inflation
The likelihood of inflation
crossing above the upper
bound of the target range
in 2005 should still 
not be neglected
Looking at the components of growth, consumption is likely to rise more slowly in
the forecast period than in previous years. The rate of consumption growth is
expected to remain below real income growth, implying a decline in households’
propensity to consume. Our forecast of investment reflects a slowdown in house-
hold and public sector fixed investment activity, along with stabilisation in corporate
sector investment growth.
Net exports are expected to contribute positively to economic growth over the next
two years, driven by decreasing import demand in response to the slowdown in
domestic absorption and by a gradual increase in Hungary’s export market share.
In the central inflation projection, disinflation is assumed to continue. We expect the
consumer price index to be slightly below 6 per cent at end-2004, 4-5 per cent at
end-2005 and around 4 per cent at end-2006. The central projection has remained
broadly unrevised relative to that presented in the August Report.
Next year, the effects of macroeconomic factors contributing to disinflation, such as
the anticipated strong exchange rate, the slower increase in wage costs and lower
consumption growth, are expected to be countered in part by certain inflationary
shocks, such as rising energy prices. Disinflation may be more solidly based in 2006,
when the fall in the growth rate of unit labour costs, the assumption of a relatively
strong forint exchange rate and the anticipated lower path of oil prices will all exert
their effects.
Based on the fan chart plotting the uncertainties around the inflation projection, the
likelihood of the consumer price index rising above the ceiling of the target range
cannot be disregarded. The principal factors behind the upward risks to the inflation
outlook are a higher path of oil prices relative to our assumption and more lax fiscal
policy. However, to a certain degree the possibility of external demand expanding
at a more modest pace offsets those risks on the upside. Compared with the pro-
jection in the August Report, there has been a slight reduction in the risk of higher
inflation at end-2005.
The inflation projection for 2006, however, is surrounded by more uncertainties.
There is a significant probability of inflation exceeding the upper limit of the 3.5 ± 1
per cent inflation target. This probability, higher than in 2005, is due to inflationary
risk related to fiscal policy, household consumption and oil prices in  2006.
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No fiscal policy tightening
is expected for 2005
The external balance
remains unchanged this
year and may start to
improve slowly later
The current account deficit is likely to reach the equivalent of 9 per cent of GDP in
2004, similarly to the outturn for the previous year. However, both the deficit and
Hungary’s external financing requirement are projected to fall gradually in
2005–2006. The external balance is nevertheless anticipated to improve only in
2006, if the assumed fiscal tightening is implemented.
Our forecast for the 2004 fiscal position has changed only slightly relative to the
August issue of the Report.
In contrast with the practice of developing assumptions in earlier Reports, we have
prepared our own forecast of the 2005 fiscal path. Based on the proposed budget
and the adopted tax legislation (both underlying the forecast), and other available
information, we maintain our view that, unless further government measures are
taken the fiscal deficit will hardly fall next year relative to the outcome expected for
2004. In addition, another factor that will hamper any more rapid improvement in
external balance is that the impact of general government on demand will be stim-
ulative next year, as the official indicators of deficit will only partially reflect robust
investment activity.
We have prepared the 2006 central projection on the basis of the 0.6 per cent de-
ficit reduction target announced by the Government. The risks relating to this pro-
jection are presented in an alternative path which only takes into account measures
which have already been resolved, other determinations and past trends, in line with
recent practice. This scenario shows that a fiscal tightening of some 1.5 per cent
would be needed in 2006 to achieve the planned 0.6 per cent deficit reduction.
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OVERVIEW
Summary table of the main scenario
(Projections are conditional, with the main scenario reflecting the projection that applies if all 
of the assumptions presented in Chapter 3 are valid; unless otherwise specified, 
percentage changes on a year earlier.)
2003 2004 2005 2006
Actual Projection
CPI
December 5.7 5.9 4.4 3.9
Annual average 4.7 6.8 4.5 4.2
Economic growth
External demand (GDP-based) 0.5 1.9 2.1 2.2
Household consumption 7.6 3.3 1.8 1.9
Gross fixed capital formation 3.4 9.2 4.2 3.6
Domestic absorption 5.4 4.8 2.5 2.3
Exports 7.6 14.5 11.3 11.0
Imports 10.4 14.8 9.3 9.2
GDP 3.0 4.0 3.7 3.5
Current account deficit
As a per cent of GDP 9.0 9.0 8.6 7.9
EUR billions 6.6 7.3 7.7 7.5
General government
ESA deficit 6.2 5.6 5.5 4.95
Demand impact1 (-0.5) (-0.7) (+0.3) (-0.7)5
Labour market
Whole-economy wage inflation2 10.9 8.3 7.9 7.3
Whole-economy employment 1.2 -0.4 -0.1 0.5
Private sector wage inflation3 8.7 9.4 8.3 7.8
Private sector unit labour cost3 4.4 5.9 4.4 2.7
Private sector employment4 0.7 0.0 0.8 0.8
Real disposable income of households 4.3 3.9 3.2 2.3
For the change of the projections relative to the August 2004 Report or a comparison with other forecasts, see Chapter 4.1.
1 Change in the SNA primary balance, adjusted for the effects of payments to the private pension system. Negative values reflect tightening. 
2 In the case of general government, this was calculated on the basis of our estimate of annual wage inflation; the thirteenth-month wage for 2004,
to be disbursed in January 2005, was added to 2004 wages.
3 Weighted average of manufacturing and market services.
4 According to the CSO Labour Force Survey.
5 Assumption, based on the Convergence Program. 
1 FINANCIAL MARKETS
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Given Hungary’s financial openness and the key role
played by international capital flows, global market
developments are crucial for domestic financial market
developments. Risk-free yields evolving on markets
around the world represent the basis on which domes-
tic money market yields are built. In addition to interna-
tional risk-free interest rates, yields in Hungary incorpo-
rate a number of risk premium elements and, conse-
quently, tend to be slightly or considerably higher than
their counterparts, depending on variations in a given
risk element over time. Therefore, we begin the analysis
Hungarian financial market yields with a summary of
developments in the global financial marketplace.
The international financial community has recently pro-
duced an exceptional situation. The rate of global eco-
nomic growth has been fast by historical standards, with
inflation remaining low in developed countries. In our
latest Report we wrote that US financial markets had
been expecting an interest rate increase since April.
And since June the Fed has raised its key interest rate
four times, by 25 basis points each, to the current level
of 2%. Markets have priced in an additional 25-bp
increase in the early months of 2005. Although the ECB
has not yet followed the Fed’s interest rate increases,
European markets also started to expect interest rate
hikes in the summer.
Solid global growth, however, increases the probability
of inflation picking up over the longer term, which in
turn adds to the likelihood of interest rate increases by
central banks. As a result, global interest rate levels may
start to rise, dampening capital flows into emerging mar-
kets, including the newly-joined economies, such as
Hungary. Consequently, the risk premium on forint-
denominated assets, normally added to the increased
global risk-free interest rate, would also be put under
pressure to rise.
However, the risks associated with a delay in the global
economic recovery were present throughout the period
under review, and in October such risk even seemed to
be growing, at the expense of signs feeding optimism.
Developments in oil prices are regarded as one of the
prime risk factors. An increase in oil prices represents a
dilemma for central banks, as it dampens growth and
fuels inflation simultaneously. The extent to which ener-
gy costs bring about second-round inflation effects is of
key importance when setting prices and wages. There
have been no signs of these effects so far either in the
US, or in Europe. In the autumn months, US and
European markets began to anticipate slower econom-
ic growth relative to their optimistic forecasts in the
summer and, as a result, they expected any central bank
interest rate increases to take place later. The European
Commission revised slightly downwards its growth
expectations in the regular autumn forecast released in
November. Changes in Euribor futures for euro inter-
bank term deposit rates show that in mid-October the
expected date of official interest rate increases was shift-
ed from end-2004 or next March to next June. In addi-
tion to a slight downward revision of growth prospects,
the most recent announcements by the president of the
ECB may also have contributed to this shift.
The adjournment of central bank interest rate increases
also had an impact on US and European long-term
yields: as an effect of the slower-than-expected interest
rate rises in early summer, long-term bond yields
declined slightly.
1.1 FOREIGN INTEREST RATES AND INVESTORS’ PERCEPTION OF RISK
Chart 1.1
Federal Reserve and ECB key interest rates
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1
As far as the sustainability of the current recovery is con-
cerned, global imbalances carry additional risk factors.
These include the high budget and current account
deficits in the US, weak corporate investment activity,
the risk that the overheated Chinese economy may sud-
denly turn from boom to bust and possible large-scale
realignment of the exchange rates of major internation-
al currencies. Thus, it is still more probable that central
bank interest rates will be raised in the US and Europe,
although this may take place later than expected in the
summer, and may be delayed even further if the down-
side risks to global economic activity continue to grow.
Risk indicators of global financial markets have not yet
reflected the dangers associated with global economic
activity. This year’s risk indicators have been driven
mainly by investors’ assessment of a scenario which
threatened unexpectedly rapid increases in central bank
interest rates in the US and in Europe and a subsequent
exaggerated reaction by financial markets to such
increases. The Fed has embarked on the adjustment of
its historically low interest rates in a prudent, well-pre-
pared manner and at a moderate pace. Consequently,
there have been no large-scale capital flows from high-
er-risk emerging markets towards more developed mar-
kets. Following their spring upsurge, the values of risk
indicators declined to their earlier levels in the summer
and have been declining since then. Nevertheless, the
occurrence of a worst-case scenario cannot be ruled
out entirely, if global financing conditions were to
change radically.
Investors’ perception of risks in the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe has only been temporarily affected
by the rapid easing of political uncertainties at the gov-
ernment level in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hun-
gary. In September, the larger-than-expected downturn
in inflation rates also contributed to the improvement in
investors’ assessment of the region as a whole. In early
October, prompted by approved budgetary restrictions
and keeping its promise, the credit rating agency
Standard&Poor’s upgraded the outlook for Polish debt
from negative to stable. At the same time, however, it
revised downward the rating of the Czech Republic due
to the country’s burgeoning budget deficit and debt.
As far as Hungary is concerned, Standard&Poor’s pub-
lished a warning at end-August stating that it would
downgrade Hungary’s rating if the country’s fiscal posi-
tion did not improve. Finally, it left Hungary’s credit rating
unchanged in October citing an expected future
improvement in the fiscal position and a better outlook
for growth. The markets’ perception of risks facing the
Hungarian economy has not deteriorated markedly
either, despite the fact that the external equilibrium posi-
tion and the budget balance have failed to improve
recently. The forint exchange rate and domestic curren-
cy-denominated government securities yields have been
affected by a number of domestic events only for tran-
sient periods, with no permanent change in either direc-
tion. Euro-denominated government bond yields, reflect-
ing country risks, have risen slightly; however, the extent
of this has not yet been indicative of a significant change.
To summarise, global financial developments have cre-
ated an exceptional situation in recent months.
Economic growth worldwide has been rather rapid
even in comparison with the last few decades, but the
risks related to the sustainability of economic activity
have grown. Inflation has remained moderate, and as a
result central bank interest rates in the industrialised
world have increased only slowly or remained at their
earlier low levels. Global risk indicators have continued
to reflect favourable financial market conditions. This
has given small-sized emerging countries with open
economies considerable leeway, as they have been
able to finance their current account deficits at low in-
terest rates, while their exports have secured economic
recovery for them, due to the rapid growth in external
demand. Therefore, the elements of domestic interest
rates closely influenced by world financial markets (i.e.
global risk-free interest rates and global risk premia)
have remained low. The global recovery, however,
remains fragile: in particular, short-term developments
in oil prices put growth and inflation at risk. It is possi-
ble, therefore, that interest rates will remain at a low
level over the short run, but this is only likely if the rate
of global economic growth slows down. Under a more
favourable growth scenario, however, the likelihood of
foreign interest rates rising more rapidly also increases.
Consequently, the current external environment charac-
terised by rapid global economic growth and the com-
bination of low inflation and interest rates is unlikely to
be sustained for a prolonged period.
Chart 1.2
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Yields on Hungarian government securities bounced up
and down during the period following the last Inflation
Report. In August, yields began to rise, but then started
falling significantly from mid-September. The most pro-
nounced drop was observed in maturities of less than 1
year.
In addition to the macroeconomic outlook for Hungary,
forint yields are also influenced by major global financial
market developments (see Chapter 1.1) and investors’
perception of risk. With favourable global conditions
from early August to mid-September, news on domestic
fundamentals (mainly centred on uncertainty about the
members of the new Hungarian Government and its
economic policy, as well as the developments in the
budget deficit) pointed towards higher risks, resulting in
rising yields. Since mid-September, however, short-term
yields have begun to fall. This decline became stronger
during October and early November. The Reuters ana-
lysts’ survey revealed a further deterioration from
September to October in the future prospects for key
macro-economic fundamentals (the budget and the cur-
rent account deficits) being of key importance from the
point of view of risk assessment. Thus, the improvement
in short-term risk assessment reflected in falling yields
should be attributed to other factors. In addition to the
favourable global environment, the formation of the
new government and stabilisation of the exchange rate
at a strong level during the entire period may also have
contributed to investors’ improved perception of risk.
In the period under review, the Monetary Council
reduced the Bank’s key policy rate by 50 basis points at
its rate-setting meetings in August and October, in line
with its practice of taking cautious monetary policy
measures. These interest rate cuts were consistent with
market expectations and did not trigger any consider-
able shifts in yields. The path of the key policy rate
expected for the next two years decreased significantly
between mid-August and mid-November, while markets
temporarily expected a significantly higher base rate in
the middle of the period. A further base rate cut of
about 180 basis points by end-2005 would be consis-
tent with the slope of the yield curve. According to the
October Reuters survey, market analysts anticipate a
200 basis point cut over the same period.
Chart 1.3
Benchmark yields in the government securities
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Chart 1.4
Historical changes in the expectations of the
current account balance and the government
deficit-to-GDP ratio
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In October, the significant gap between the yield curve
and interest rate expectations revealed by the Reuters
poll narrowed, pointing to a lower degree of uncertainty
around the expected path of the MNB’s key policy rate.
Longer-term yields behaved differently from short-term
yields in a number of aspects. The changes in the path
of the implied forward yield curve, reflecting yield
expectations, indicate that they moved up at all maturi-
ties from August to mid-September, most likely in
response to uncertainties arising from the formation of
the new government. This was, however, followed by a
significant fall at all horizons in future expected yields.
All in all, compared to August, until November the for-
ward yield curve rotated around its 10-year-endpoint.
The risk assessment of the long-term path of the
Hungarian economy is best captured by EUR/HUF for-
ward yield differentials: longer-term differentials are also
indicative of the expected date of the adoption of the
euro. Forward differentials starting in 5 and 10 years
time have followed a rather unfavourable path in 2004
as a whole. Long-term forward differentials followed an
upward trend until September, and then started to fall,
eventually becoming stable beginning early November.
The permanently high risk premium at longer horizons
reveal that market participants have definitely grown
more pessimistic about the outlook for the Hungarian
economy over the long term relative to earlier years. In
this respect, market concerns related to the conver-
gence path with the objective of adopting the euro in
2010 have also mounted.
On the whole, movements in short and long-term yields
indicate that, although investors’ assessment of short-
term developments has improved over the past three
months, long-term risks remain persistently high. The
sustained uncertainty related to long-term develop-
ments points to the fact that market participants expect
a more unfavourable macroeconomic path in the com-
ing few years than predicted in the convergence pro-
gramme targeting the adoption of the euro.
Chart 1.5
Expected path of the central bank base rate on
the basis of the forward yield curve
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Chart 1.6
Implied one-year forward rates for different dates
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Chart 1.7
Three-month implied forward differentials
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The exchange rate of the forint has followed a relatively
stable path along a trend of moderate appreciation; it has
appreciated against the euro by nearly 2 per cent since
our last report. The volatility of the exchange rate has
declined relative to earlier periods, despite the fact that
several episodes of temporary weakness interrupted the
trend of the exchange rate. The announcement of the for-
mation of a new government in early August, followed by
the replacement of the prime minister, uncertainties sur-
rounding the members of the government and its expect-
ed economic policy and, since mid-October, the
increased risks related to the planned amendment of the
Central Bank Act have all been reflected in movements of
the exchange rate. Concerns about this year’s budget and
Q2 current account data have also had a negative effect
on the exchange rate. However, the episodes of depreci-
ation proved to be temporary and moderate in most
cases.
The MNB’s cautious approach to interest rate cuts has
also contributed to the stabilisation of the exchange rate.
This has led to a situation in which changes in the percep-
tion of risk have been typically reflected in the yield curve,
as opposed to the exchange rate. In addition, the proxim-
ity of the upper limit of the intervention band may explain
why movements in the exchange rate have been confined
to a relatively narrow range. Regional and global factors
may also have had a favourable impact, in that reactions
of the forint exchange rate to unfavourable news about
economic fundamentals have been mild and short-lived.1
The global financial market risk environment remains
extraordinarily benign. In addition, exchange rate develop-
ments in Central and Eastern Europe have also been
favourable: since June, the zloty has strengthened consid-
erably and the Czech and Slovak currencies have been
fairly stable.
The implied volatility of forint-denominated derivative
products (options) and Reuters’ monthly surveys of macro-
analysts’ expectations can be used to obtain a picture of
the uncertainty in the market’s shorter-term exchange rate
expectations. The development of the one-month implied
volatility reflects the uncertainties of August; however,
expected fluctuations in the exchange rate show a down-
ward trend. Changes in one-year implied volatility also sug-
gest that the uncertainty surrounding exchange rate expec-
tations has fallen somewhat in recent months.
Chart 1.8
Exchange rate of the forint
Chart 1.9
Exchange rates of the currencies of selected new
EU Member States vis-à-vis the euro
Appreciation in percentages since 2 January 2004
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1 See Chapter 1.1.
240
245
250
255
260
265
270
275
EUR/HUF
240
245
250
255
260
265
270
275
EUR/HUF
Ja
n.
 0
4
F
eb
. 0
4
M
ar
. 0
4
A
pr
. 0
4
M
ay
 0
4
Ju
ne
 0
4
Ju
ly
 0
4
A
ug
. 0
4
S
ep
t. 
04
O
ct
. 0
4
N
ov
. 0
4
18 MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
1 FINANCIAL MARKETS
1
The October Reuters survey provides a similar picture:
the dispersion of exchange rate levels expected by ana-
lysts by end-2004 and end-2005 has decreased some-
what. All these aspects suggest that the uncertainty
about expectations has declined in line with the decline
in exchange rate volatility, at least in the short run.
Despite the appreciation since mid-July, the exchange
rate expected for end-2004 (EUR/HUF 252) does not
differ considerably from the level in the July Reuters
survey of macroanalysts. Forecasters predict a broadly
horizontal path up to December 2005 (the rate expect-
ed for this date is EUR/HUF 253), which does not rep-
resent a shift away from the level anticipated in the July
survey either. According to the Reuters poll, market
expectations related to the date of Hungary’s euro
adoption have shifted even further out since the
August survey. Analysts participating in the survey hold
the view that the date of adoption of the euro by Hun-
gary could be delayed beyond the target date of 2010
by years. This indicates that, in contrast to the short
run, long-term expectations of exchange rate and yields
have not improved considerably.
Following a long period of stagnation in mid-2004, for-
eign investors have significantly stepped up their hold-
ings of forint-denominated government securities since
early August, apart from a short period at end-August,
when concerns relating to the composition of the new
government and its policies mounted. After this
episode, foreign investors’ holdings of government
securities resumed their upward trend, but declined a
little in October. There has been a small increase in No-
vember in the average maturity of holdings, but it still
remained low compared with earlier years.
The build-up in foreign investors’ holdings of govern-
ment securities has not been accompanied by taking
pro-forint positions. This is consistent with the increase
in net swap positions and the relative stability of the
exchange rate in recent months. The co-movement of
government securities holdings and net swap positions
Chart 1.10
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may be due to the fact that foreign investors purchasing
government securities avoid taking pro-forint positions
and cover exchange rate risks related to government
securities by entering into swaps. This view is also sup-
ported by the fact that the exchange rate has been fluc-
tuating near the upper limit of the intervention band,
where the risk of a depreciation is much larger than that
of a significant appreciation.
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1.4.1 REAL INTEREST RATES
Monetary policy primarily affects the real economy
through the real exchange rate and real interest rates.
Given the dominance of external trade in the Hungarian
economy, the forint exchange rate channel plays a mo-
re important role. Below, we briefly outline the recent
changes and possible future developments in these two
variables as anticipated by market participants. This
description of market expectations relies on the Reuters
survey, which, although not a perfect representative
sample of all economic agents, provides a good picture
of general trends.
The forward-looking real interest rate, which is an
important source of information about the monetary
policy stance, has fallen slightly in recent months, but its
level has remained high by historical standards, exceed-
ing 5 per cent. This drop in the forward-looking real in-
terest rate is mainly due to the decline in one-year
yields, given that inflation expectations for 2005 barely
changed up to October according to the Reuters survey
of analysts. Their expectations suggest that the forward-
looking real interest rate expected for early 2005 may
decline further, although remaining above 5 per cent.
Due to the impact of indirect tax increases on infla-
tion, the contemporaneous real interest rate is consid-
erably lower than the forward-looking real interest
rate. In September, the contemporaneous real interest
rate rose from the level reached in earlier months to
nearly 4 per cent. This was due mainly to the stronger-
than-expected disinflation data for September. As the
effect of indirect tax increases winds down, the level
of the contemporaneous real interest rate may come
near to that of the forward-looking real interest rate by
early 2005.
1.4.2 REAL EXCHANGE RATES
Following the massive nominal appreciation in the peri-
od February–March, the real effective exchange rate
calculated on the basis of the consumer price index
strengthened only moderately. The 1-per-cent apprecia-
tion since May was caused by excess inflation in Hun-
1.4 MONETARY CONDITIONS
Chart 1.14
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gary. During the period, the nominal effective exchange
rate remained practically unchanged.
Based on market analysts’ exchange rate and infla-
tion expectations, we have calculated the real
exchange rate path they anticipate up to end-2005.
The slight real depreciation expected for the rest of
this year is mainly due to the expected depreciation
of the nominal exchange rate by end-2004, while,
taking the expected horizontal exchange rate path
into account, the real appreciation expected for
2005 is wholly attributable to the differential
between domestic and foreign inflation. The expect-
ed trend of the real exchange rate remains somewhat
below the pace of equilibrium real appreciation for
the Hungarian economy.

2 INFLATION AND ITS DETERMINING FACTORS UP
TO MID-2004
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Gross domestic output continued to pick up in 2004
Q2, driven by sustained vigorous external demand.
However, a closer look at the recovery reveals that in
the corporate sector there are signs suggesting that
short-term growth dynamics slowed relative to Q1.
Nevertheless, demand generated by both the general
government and households contributed to economic
recovery to a larger-than-expected extent.
2.1.1 EXTERNAL DEMAND
The economic recovery in Europe, key to Hungary’s
domestic economic activity, was as robust in Q2 as it
was in Q1. The engine of this recovery was a further
acceleration in export growth, whereas neither house-
hold consumption nor fixed investment showed any
sign of an upturn. GDP growth in Hungary’s trading
partners was somewhat lower than in Q1, but even so,
it increased at an annualised rate of approximately 2 per
cent. Calculated as Hungary’s foreign trade partners’
weighted increase in imports, the size of Hungary’s ex-
port markets grew even more markedly, with an annu-
alised increase of close to 10 per cent in Q2.
Data for Q3 somewhat shade this favourable picture. In
July and August, both industrial production and the vol-
ume of new orders declined in the euro area, especial-
ly in Germany, Hungary’s most important trading part-
ner. The IFO Institute’s business climate index has been
falling virtually since early 2004, reflecting an
unfavourable outlook for industrial economic activity in
Germany. Furthermore, business confidence indices of
the euro area (EABCI) also remained flat in Q3.
With respect to cost developments, it was mainly high
oil prices that affected external demand, although the
appreciation of the euro vis-à-vis the dollar softened this
impact considerably. In our view, a strong euro poses
no imminent threat to competitiveness in the euro area,
as long as economic growth in the USA, sustained by
high domestic demand, continues at a similar pace.
However, the recent interest rate increases by the
Federal Reserve suggest that the US economy is likely
to slow down. If this is the case, higher energy prices
and a strong euro may be more acutely felt in the euro
area as well.
2.1.2 OUTPUT
In 2004 Q2, gross manufacturing output growth
remained high, exceeding 10 per cent on an annualised
quarterly basis. However, value added in the sector
slowed significantly: Compared with an increase of 9
per cent on an annualised quarterly basis in Q1, it bare-
2.1 ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
Size of Hungary’s export markets and GDP in its
foreign trade partners
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ly rose by more than 5 per cent in Q2. In the short run,
the latter is likely to have been a better indicator of eco-
nomic activity in the corporate sector, as gross output
has also slowed down recently, judging from available
data for Q3.
Given the favourable developments in external demand
in Q2 and goods exports reflecting equally favourable
economic activities, the extent of the slowdown in man-
ufacturing output is slightly surprising. This is, however,
somewhat mitigated by the fact that value added in
manufacturing in 2003 Q4 and 2004 Q1 was much
higher than expected based on external demand pre-
vailing at that time. The slowdown in Q2 can be seen as
a correction in the growth of manufacturing output.
Moreover, lagging productivity growth may also be
responsible for the slowdown in production.
In 2004 Q2, value added in market services also fell
behind what had been expected (with annualised
growth amounting to roughly 3 per cent, relative to 4.5
per cent in the preceding quarter), despite the fact that
higher-than-assumed household consumption would
also have justified a more marked increase, in addition
to robust external demand. Recent data suggest that
value added in market services is increasingly slow in
responding to changes in the factors that used to influ-
ence it strongly. Of its chief components, two (trans-
portation and commercial services) show unambiguous
signs of a slowdown. The annual average increase,
which stood around 4–5 per cent even during the
recent downturn, has been moving increasingly nearer
to the 3 per cent threshold.
Quarterly growth in construction was vigorous in Q2,
amounting to an annualised 6 per cent. The sector
seems to have returned to the growth trajectory that it
left in 2003 Q1. July and August data on construction
point to consistent expansion in the sector.
2.1.3 HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION, 
SAVINGS AND FIXED INVESTMENT
Based on CSO data, household consumption growth
picked up in Q2. Nevertheless, the figures were not as
high as seen in the previous two years, when house-
holds’ propensity to consume2 exceeded 90 per cent.
The growth rate (5.1 per cent relative to 2003 Q2) cal-
culated from CSO data is, however, difficult to place in
a business cycle context, since it is biased due to one-
off effects, including changes in regulations on motor
vehicle purchases and sales of ICT goods (see Chapter
4.5). If, in order to identify the underlying trend, we
eliminate these one-off effects from the series, it is clear
that the underlying growth is not so lively.
This would reflect developments in households’ finan-
cial savings somewhat better. Financial accounts data
for Q2 reveal that the sector’s financial savings grew sig-
nificantly, which would imply a sharp rise in household
income, given the growth rate of consumption and the
estimated strong dynamics of household investment. As
an increase in real wages cannot fully account for such
a rise in income, we must look to what is called ‘other
income’ in order to identify the key source of house-
hold income growth. Based on available data, it is main-
ly interest income, income on equity (dividends and
equity price gains), the disbursement of agricultural sub-
sidies in relation to EU and the effect of tax benefits
connected to subsidised mortgage contracts, to which
the increase in other income can be ascribed.
In line with developments last year, major indicators of
households’ investment (the stock of mortgage con-
tracts and the number of dwelling permits) imply sus-
tained activity. The number of completed dwellings
increased by 45 per cent in the first three quarters of
2004 compared to the same period of 2003 (this is par-
Value added in manufacturing 
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Chart 2.3
99.0
100.0
101.0
102.0
103.0
104.0
2000 = 100
99.0
100.0
101.0
102.0
103.0
104.0
2000 = 100
00
 Q
1
00
 Q
3
01
 Q
1
01
 Q
3
02
 Q
1
02
 Q
3
03
 Q
1
03
 Q
3
04
 Q
1
Manufacturing Market services
*Based on logarithmic values.
Household consumption expenditure 
and financial savings*
Chart 2.4
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Per cent
—2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Per cent
00
 Q
1
00
 Q
3
01
 Q
1
01
 Q
3
02
 Q
1
02
 Q
3
03
 Q
1
03
 Q
3
04
 Q
1
Households' consumption expenditures (left-hand scale)
Financial savings (right-hand scale)
*Consumption: annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rate; savings:
ratio to disposable income.
2 Consumption expenditure as a proportion of disposable income.
27QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION
2 INFLATION AND ITS DETERMINING FACTORS UP TO MID-2004
2
tially explained by base effects). It, however, also
reflects supply inelasticities, i.e. buoyant construction
activity in spite of falling relative real estate prices. The
growth rate of real dwelling prices has been slowing
since 2003 Q2, and actually showed a decrease from
2004 Q2 on, reflecting weakening demand.
As a consequence, the number of dwelling permits
decreased. This, however, was not as rapid as we
expected earlier: in the first nine months of the year the
number of permits was still 2 per cent higher than in the
correspondig (historically outstanding) period of the last
year, partly reflecing statistical base effects.
2.1.4 CORPORATE FIXED INVESTMENT 
AND INVENTORIES
There was a surprise plunge in corporate fixed invest-
ment activity in 2004 Q2, exceeding an annual rate of
5 per cent.
Despite a downward adjustment of the earlier robust
growth, our perception of the underlying trend remains
unchanged. Fuelled by an upturn in the external busi-
ness cycle, corporate fixed investment activity began to
gather momentum in 2003, with a relapse in 2004 Q2
mainly representing a one-off impact in the trend. Thus,
trendlike growth continues, though its rate may flatten
out. The latter point seems to be corroborated by the
fact that the capacity utilisation indicator (based on a
Kopint-Datorg survey), in contrast with earlier consis-
tent growth, has been broadly unchanged for two quar-
ters now. Other business surveys point to a diminishing
number of corporate managers that deem existing
capacity as insufficient to meet future orders.
With respect to industrial economic activity, it is impor-
tant that manufacturing fixed investment only slowed
moderately, but it is market service providers’ fixed
investment activity that shows signs of a more signifi-
cant slowdown. This corresponds more closely to exist-
ing trends in production and an ongoing substitution of
costlier labour with capital.
Data for Q2 reveal further growth in whole-economy
inventories. This, however, masks a fall in manufacturing
stocks. Although the level of inventories purchased
increased slightly, consistent with the current business
cycle, that of own-produced inventories decreased con-
siderably. By contrast, commercial inventories have
been growing vigorously. The sales prospects of trading
companies are likely to have been over-optimistic; as a
result, they retained a sizeable amount of stocks owing
to a slowdown in household consumption in H1.
Corporate fixed investment*
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2.1.5 EXTERNAL TRADE
As mentioned in our previous Report, data on external
trade are subject to greater uncertainty, owing to the
introduction of the new statistical reporting system.
In the August Report, we referred to downward back-
ward-looking revisions in the case of exports of goods,
with the growth trajectory of goods exports perceived
as increasingly flat. Recent revisions tend to be more
upward; as a result, data attest to more dynamic growth
in exports.
As regards imports of goods, in addition to data revi-
sions, other problems – originating from EU accession –
render interpretation of the data a sensitive issue.
Purchases drawn forward due to Hungary’s EU acces-
sion as detailed in the August Report also had to be
taken into consideration, and a further accounting prob-
lem arose, attributable to the ‘sudden’ release of goods
imported from the EU and stored in public warehouses
prior to accession. According to a CSO estimate, this
latter amounts to close to EUR 1 billion, and by its
nature it is not seen as a lasting trend, but a one-off
effect. It may have greatly contributed to the fact that
the increase in imports in the middle of this year
appeared much higher than justified by the business
cycle.
In order to see the underlying direction of the process,
actual import data must be corrected with both pur-
chases drawn forward, and goods released from public
warehouses. Without the necessary corrections one
could have the impression that imports of goods have
been stagnating after a dynamic increase in Q1, where-
as the adjusted series reflects a rise in imports in line
with the rest of business cycle indicators.
Export and import data under the system of national
accounts (comprising trade in goods and services) for
Q2 clearly point to import growth exceeding export
growth. As the corporate business cycle was slightly
more lacklustre in Q2, the sharp rise in imports may be
imputed to an increase in household consumption and
livelier government fixed investment activity, in con-
junction with transitory effects.
2.1.6 COMPETITIVENESS
Major real effective exchange rate indices apprecatied
across the board in Q2, attributable mostly to the
appreciation of the forint’s exchange rate vis-à-vis the
euro. In the case of price-based real effective exchange
rates indices, appreciation goes further back in time.
This stemmed from a rise in domestic consumer and
producer prices exceeding those abroad. The ULC-
based real effective exchange rate index in manufactur-
ing was, however, broadly flat in the preceding quarters,
as moderate nominal appreciation was associated with
a decline in domestic ULCs. In Q2, not only did the
nominal exchange rate of the forint appreciated more
dynamically, the domestic ULCs rose as well.
The trend of goods exports and its revision
At current prices, in EUR
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Alhough some of the real effective exchange rate indices
could easily suggest a weakening competitiveness posi-
tion, Hungary’s market share in EU-15 slightly increased.
Final data are only available for Q1, but judging from the
import statistics of some of Hungary’s major trading part-
ners (especially Germany), it is safe to say that Hungary’s
share in the entire EU-15 market has grown.
We come to similar findings based on the develop-
ments in the OECD’s export performance indicators
which allow us to look at regional developments.3 Due
to the differences in the country structure of export mar-
kets as well as differences in export price deflators and
exchange rate developments, when expressed in euros
at current prices the export growth of the Czech
Republic and Poland is higher than that of Hungary, but
(relative) competitiveness is better measured by the ex-
port performance indicator. Since Hungary’s export
market size has grown less rapidly as that of the Czech
Republic and Poland since 1999,4 its export perform-
ance was better than theirs in some of those years. And,
according to the most recent data, Hungary’s export
performance was also the strongest in the first half of
2004.
2.1.7 ECONOMIC GROWTH
In 2004 H1, GDP was 4.1 per cent higher than a year
earlier. Despite less favourable data for Q2, this strong
GDP growth was primarily attributable to a rise in gross
capital formation. Household consumption also con-
tributed considerably to GDP growth, though to a less-
er extent than in 2003. Net exports continued to make
a negative contribution, although to a lesser degree
than last year.
In interpreting the 4.1 per cent outturn for growth, it is
important to remember that based on our calculations
so far calendar effects5 in 2004 may reflect a higher rate
of GDP growth than what could be inferred from actu-
al trends in the business cycle, with a difference even
amounting to up to an annual 0.2–0.3 per cent. These
effects may have been reflected already in H1 data.
In a regional comparison, the growth of Hungary’s out-
put in the first half was slightly higher than in the Czech
Real effective exchange rate indices*
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Republic. Poland, however, where both domestic
demand and net exports were more robust, outper-
formed both countries (the higher export growth may
be related to the stronger export market growth of
Poland).
GDP growth in the region
Annual growth
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The August Report identified mounting labour market
tightness as an upside risk to our inflation projection.
We perceived an acceleration in wage inflation and an
increasing amount of data on skilled labour shortage to
be a sign of labour market tightness. However, based
on data for Q2 and Q3, labour market tightness seems
to have eased somewhat with wage inflation (although
high, but back on a declining trend again) and the
dynamics of labour demand (total hours worked) slow-
ing. An easing of labour market tightness, if it endures,
would be in line with the more reluctant business activ-
ity in the corporate sector. On the other hand, labour
supply constraints may be still present in the economy
and the risk of labour market mismatches has not nec-
essarily declined in the long run.
2.2.1 LABOUR INPUT
Based on total hours worked, it is safe to assume that
labour demand in the private sector, which had been
strong since mid-2003, slowed down last quarter. The
underlying reasons for this include a consistent decline
in manufacturing labour input, and an increase in labour
demand in the market services sector which was lower
than labour demand witnessed in the preceding period.
Weaker labour demand in the private sector may be
related to a downturn in economic activity.
Flagging manufacturing labour demand is the result of
two contrasting impacts. On the one hand, manufactur-
ing employment declined, while on the other labour
intensity increased. As we have pointed out in our pre-
vious reports, substitution of labour with capital may
also play a part in labour intensity and employment
moving in opposite directions for over a year now.
There is, however, uncertainty regarding the extent to
which these trends are linked to substitution between
the factors of production and to the current phase of
the business cycle.
Historically speaking, labour intensity and employment
diverged for a longer period of time between 1995 and
1996. This could easily suggest that employment is fol-
lowing a pattern similar to the one seen during the pre-
vious recovery, and that the time lag in its growth is not
attributable to changes in the structure of production.6
Nevertheless, we believe that structural and business
cycle-related shocks have mingled strongly in the
Hungarian economy over the past decade. Thus, it is
highly probable that an important structural transforma-
tion occurred during the previous upswings. Likewise,
the current steady decline in manufacturing employ-
ment can also be ascribed to restructuring, the latter be-
ing also responsible for the ongoing phasing-out of
activities in the textile industry since 2003. By contrast,
Total hours worked
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employment in machinery and equipment, the most
sensitive sector to the external business cycle, has been
slowly picking up. Overall, both past and current busi-
ness cycle-related effects are hard to separate from one
another.
Weakening labour demand in the market services sec-
tor can be ascribed to a slowdown in employment. We
remarked in our previous Reports that it was difficult to
explain what reserves of labour supply had allowed for
employment in the market services sector to rise rather
rapidly since early 2003. Taking into consideration the
difficulty involved in the interchangeability of skills, we
thought that strong labour demand in the sector was,
sooner or later, to face labour supply constraints.
Consequently, the slowdown in employment is consis-
tent with our expectations. Within the market services
sector, labour demand weakened in the hotels and
restaurants as well as the transportation sectors, where-
as it strengthened rapidly in the trade and real estate,
economic services sectors.
However, a significant uncertainity is contained in the
employment statistics. Institutional statistics, covering
full-time employees at companies employing over five
persons and other organisations, suggest a further,
albeit slower, increase in employment. By contrast, the
household labour force survey (LFS) indicates a decline
in employment this year. The scope of the LFS is wider
than that of institutional statistics, including self-
employed and part-time workers as well. As, based on
direct statistics, neither the number of self-employed
nor the number of part-time workers decreased in Q2
and Q3, we cannot presently explain the difference
between the LFS and the institutional statistics.
2.2.2 LABOUR MARKET RESERVES AND TIGHTNESS
Unemployment, which represents the most important
labour reserve for the economy, increased further in
2004 Q3, indicating an easing of labour market tight-
ness. Rising unemployment is corroborated by the num-
ber of registered unemployed and LFS data. It is mainly
moderate labour demand in the private sector that was
responsible for growing unemployment.
The LFS statistics points to a rise in the number of the
economically inactive. Some findings of labour market
research reveal that the attachment of the unemployed
and certain groups of the economically inactive to the
Employment in manufacturing and the market
services sector
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labour market is rather similar. Thus, an increase in the
number of the economically inactive may also suggest
some easing of labour market tightness. However, the
assessment of the present trend is ambigious.7 Overall,
only a smaller number of those that exited employment
seem to have become unemployed due to sluggish
labour demand. An overwhelming majority have
become economically inactive. 
Furthermore, in Q3 a high level of mass lay-offs
remained, but vacancies dropped significantly. This is
again considered as a sign of weaker labour demand.
2.2.3 WAGE INFLATION
Data for Q2 and Q3 show that, although the level of
wage inflation is still high, it has started to decline again,
following a pick-up from early 2003. This decline in
wage inflation is consistent with our assumptions about
an easing of labour market tightness. Both manufactur-
ing and market services recorded a drop in wage infla-
tion.
Although there was no revision of CSO data, seasonal-
ly adjusted data responded to the inclusion of new data
points sensitively, markedly dampening the perception
of the increase in early 2004.
On the other hand, corporate expectations of wage
inflation in TÁRKI’s survey suggest only a moderate
decrease in wage inflation. Expected and perceived
wage inflation has moved in close conjunction (within
the 1 basis point range) over the past 3 quarters. The
nearly identical level of the expected and perceived
wage inflation shows that expectations have become
stuck, on the basis of which we could anticipate only a
slow decline.
The slowdown in manufacturing wage inflation in previ-
ous quarters is in keeping with decelerating productivi-
ty growth, attributable to a downturn in manufacturing
business activity. However, wage adjustment has not
been perfect and the rise in labour costs in Q2 and Q3,
which exceeded productivity growth, was unable to
accommodate a further reduction in the wage share
(i.e. an increase in the profit on labour). Differences
between the sectors where activities are being phased
out and those directly affected by the business cycle are
reflected also in wages in the various manufacturing
Number of announced mass lay-offs 
and reported vacancies 
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branches. Wage increase is the most robust in machin-
ery and equipment, while that in the textile industry falls
behind the manufacturing average.
In preparing our August Report, we assumed that the
deterioration in profitability in market services, under-
way since early 2003, was unsustainable in the long
run, and expected firms to adjust. Data for previous
quarters suggest that the adjustment began mainly
through restraining employment growth and to a lesser
extent by holding wage growth under control. Recent
data reveal that-as a result of moderate employment
growth-the decline in productivity growth since early
2004 has come to a halt, despite the slowdown in out-
put growth.
Overall, as a result of both employment and wage
adjustment, the growth rate of nominal ULCs has
slowed significantly in the private sector. At the same
time, the decrease in real ULC since late 2002 has
come to an end, which may signal the fragility of the
developments.
Productivity, wages and profits 
in manufacturing*
Annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates
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In 2004 Q3, CPI and core inflation stood at 7.0 and 5.9
per cent respectively, representing a decline of 0.3 per-
centage point in both indices relative to the previous
quarter. In addition, the constant tax price index (CTI),
which filters out the change in indirect taxes, dropped by
0.2 percentage point to 4.9 per cent. Broadly speaking,
trend inflation and the rate of price increase of goods
characterised by erratic price changes also fell. Both
base effects and actual developments contributed to the
reduction in indices capturing annual price changes.
As a result, recent months have witnessed steady disin-
flation, with the consumer price index falling from its 7.6
per cent peak in May to 6.3 per cent in October.
We employ several indicators that can capture lasting
trends in inflation. In addition to taking the CSO’s core
inflation and the constant tax consumer price index into
consideration, we also provide estimates for develop-
ments in core inflation excluding the prices of tobacco
products and another estimate excluding indirect taxes.
Essentially, each indicator attests a slowdown in infla-
tion in 2004 Q2 and Q3.8
CPI and core inflation
Annual changes
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2.3 INFLATION DEVELOPMENTS
Table 2.1
2004 Q1 2004 Q2 2004 Q3
Core inflation 6.0 6.2 5.9
Unprocessed foods 4.9 8.0 11.9
Motor fuels and market-priced energy 1.0 7.8 7.6
Regulated prices 11.7 10.1 8.3
CPI 6.8 7.3 7.0
CPI and its major components
Table 2.2
Effect of changes in indirect taxes on price indices
Included Not included (constant tax price index)
2003 Q4 2004 Q1 2004 Q2 2004 Q3 2003 Q4 2004 Q1 2004 Q2 2004 Q3
CPI 5.4 6.8 7.3 7.0 4.9* 5.0 5.1 4.9
Core inflation 4.8 6.0 6.2 5.9 4.3* 4.9* 4.4* 4.2*
Impact of indirect taxes on inflation
Annual percentage changes
8 Nevertheless, we would like to point out that such net-type indicators are unsuitable for the elimination of indirect effects stemming from increases in
indirect taxes. This means that, unless economic participants pass increases in indirect taxes on to consumers in their entirety, net prices will (albeit only
in the short run) fall, which–ceteris paribus–would not be the case if indirect taxes had not been raised. It follows then that net prices are expected to fall
after rises in indirect taxes, which, however, does not necessarily constitute part of longer-term trends in inflation.
* MNB estimate.
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The decline in trend inflation in the past two quarters
was the result of contrasting trends on the supply and
demand sides.
As regards the labour market, overall average and unit
labour costs have been at a high level throughout the
private sector over the past six months, albeit indica-
tions of a slowdown have also been observed.
Furthermore, imported inflation, which we approximate
with euro area tradables inflation, excluding energy
prices, was broadly flat. In fact, translated into forint, im-
port prices actually even dropped as a result of the
appreciation of the exchange rate. However, the rise in
oil prices since May adds to costs, which hitherto has
only been reflected in market energy prices. In brief,
inflation has been affected in a contradictory way by the
supply side: the stable, strong forint exchange rate sig-
nificantly reduced the inflationary pressure of increasing
labour costs and world oil prices.
By contrast, demand has been able to put a brake on
inflation more effectively over the past six months, as
the growth rate of household consumption, represent-
ing the bulk of aggregate demand, has been slow. These
supply and demand factors affected the individual eco-
nomic sectors differently.
Tradables inflation decreased considerably in Q3. This
may be attributable primarily to the forint’s exchange
rate, which has been appreciating since early 2004,
dampening import prices directly. Furthermore, domes-
tic producers of tradables competing with imported
goods has also allowed for moderating prices. The
price development of tradables has responded strong-
ly to movements in the forint exchange rate: on the
one hand, sharp tradable inflation followed the
exchange rate depreciation last year. On the other
hand, the exchange rate appreciation this year quickly
stimulated disinflation. The latter aspect is partly
masked by second-quarter data, as the increase in the
registration tax of motor cars in May counter-balanced
the exchange rate appreciation. Finally, increasingly
intense competition, further stimulated by Hungary’s
EU accession, must have contributed to tradables disin-
flation.
Non-tradables inflation remained broadly flat in Q3;
nevertheless, it remained well below the level of 2003
H2. This is somewhat surprising, as in late 2003 and
early 2004 the sector was exposed to several supply
shocks (e.g. a rise in the producer prices of energy and
indirect taxes and the introduction of energy and eco-
taxes, etc.), representing an upside risk to inflation.
There may be other reasons for a lower increase in
prices than these factors would justify. One is that, as
we pointed out when net-type indicators were dis-
cussed, in order to retain their market shares, service
providers in certain highly competitive markets do not
fully pass on the effect of increases in indirect taxes to
consumers (at least in the short run), i.e. they are likely
to reduce their prices. The other reason is that house-
hold consumption has been slowing since year-end
2002, which may, in general, set a limit to efforts in the
non-tradables sector, which is most sensitive to changes
in demand, to fully incorporate increases in costs into
prices.
Although inflation in processed foods rose until mid-
2004 following the increases in indirect taxes in early
2004, this trend seems to have reversed in Q3. There
are two underlying reasons for this. One is that, after
Hungary’s EU accession, in the market of certain food-
stuffs (chiefly milk and dairy products) imported goods
appeared, the prices of which were much lower than
Tradables inflation
Seasonally adjusted, annualised 
quarter-on-quarter growth rates
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those of domestic products. This forced domestic pro-
ducers to reduce their prices. A fall in the price of
wheat, and hence flour, since the early summer of 2004
has resulted in a substantial reduction in various bakery
products (e.g. bread, baked goods, pasta, etc.).
In early 2004, there was a marked increase in the excise
duty on tobacco products. Producers passed on the
effect of this to consumers in two parts: one early this
year, the other in late summer. Since higher-priced
products will only appear in shops when existing com-
mercial stocks are depleted, the increase will feed
through to prices only gradually from one month to the
next. We estimate that, prior to end-Q3, approximately
80 per cent of the increase in producer prices was
reflected in data.
Although, in addition to trend inflation, goods charac-
terised by volatile price changes also reduced inflation
in Q3, the related trends ran broadly counter to each
other.
Unprocessed food, particularly pork, the price of which
rose in conjunction with prices abroad, boosted infla-
tion. It should be noted, however, that, consistent with
global market trends, at end-Q3 there seemed to be a
break in the sharp rise in prices that occurred in this
range of products.
Although vehicle fuel and market energy yearly price inde-
ces stopped rising in Q3, high prices for oil and gas kept
their prices high as well. Rising global market energy
prices were partially offset by the euro appreciating vis-à-
vis the dollar, the forint appreciating vis-à-vis the euro and
a temporary reduction in the excise duty on vehicle fuels.
Regulated price inflation fell markedly in Q3. This, how-
ever, was attributable to base effects rather than actual
measures (i.e. no measures similar to the rise in the
price of gas in mid-2003 or that of electricity in
September were taken).
2.3.1 INFLATION EXPECTATIONS
With the CPI declining in Q3, economic participants’
perceived inflation and inflation expectations also
receded.
Firms
Consistent with the actual trends in inflation, the rate
of inflation as perceived by corporate executives
included in the TÁRKI’s survey started to decline in
2004 Q3 after an unbroken rise lasting approximately
one year. This was also true in respect of their inflation
expectations, which, however, represented the contin-
uation of a gradual slowdown in a sudden rise in such
expectations following the rises in indirect taxes early
this year.
Not only the temporal shifts in, but also the distribution
of expectations can provide important information
when inflation expectations are evaluated. The TÁRKI
survey reveals that since mid-2003, increased inflation
expectations were associated with a rise in their hetero-
geneity. At the same time, however, both inflation
expectations and their range fell in the past three quar-
ters, i.e. expectations of falling inflation reflect higher-
than-earlier consistency in the opinions of respondent
corporate executives.
Corporate managers’ declining inflation expectations
are further corroborated by the fact that they expect a
slowdown not only in inflation, but also in the sales
prices set by their own firms. Nevertheless, they did not
report any decline in sales prices in past periods.9
Inflation perception, expectations 
and their variation by corporate executives 
in the TÁRKI survey
For the previous and the next 12 months
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* A trimmed average of corporate executives’ responses. In calculat-
ing an arithmetic average, we ignored the responses that were small-
er than three times the amount of the interquartile in the case of the
lower quartile, and the ones that were larger than three times the
amount of the interquartile in the case of the higher quartile. In con-
sequence, we ignored, on average, 1.2 per cent of the responses con-
cerning inflation expectations and 0.8 per cent of the ones related to
perceived inflation. Standard deviation of expectations is calculated
from the complete sample (including all responses).
9 It should be noted that TÁRKI business executives’ expected and perceived nominal wage increases only partially corroborate the perception of gener-
al disinflation. While perceived nominal wage increase slightly diminished compared to the preceding quarter, expectations of future wage increases grew
slightly. See Chart 2.21.
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Households
TÁRKI’s survey of households’ expectations yielded sim-
ilar results: both perceived and expected inflation
declined. This is consistent with responses concerning
perceived and expected inflation in GKI’s household
confidence survey. The GKI monthly data indicate no
significant shifts within the past quarter though.
Analysts
Owing partly to actual data on inflation in Q3, which
were lower than expected by the market, both market
analysts and research institutes revised down their
respective short-term inflation projections according to
the October Reuters poll. Thus, in September, inflation
projected for December 2004 fell by 0.3 basis point to
6 per cent relative to end-Q2. However, there were no
material changes in analysts’ medium-term inflation
expectations for December 2005.
Overall, we conclude that both households’ and busi-
ness executives’ inflation expectations declined last
quarter. Although the rise in inflation early this year, fun-
damentally attributable to increases in indirect taxes,
also fuelled inflation expectations, lower inflation data
for Q3 reduced both perceived and expected inflation.
This seems to substantiate the hypothesis that a tran-
sient rise in inflation early in the year did not permanent-
ly raise inflation expectations. The stable and stronger-
than-earlier forint exchange rate may have indirectly
played a significant role here.
Households’ perceived and expected inflation
based on the TÁRKI survey
For the previous and the next 12 months
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Assuming no change in the October monetary condi-
tions and that all other assumptions of the main scenario
apply, a gradual slowdown in inflation is expected over
the forecast period. In the current forecast, disinflation is
particularly strong in early 2005 and then slows down
gradually thereafter. On the whole, the consumer price
index is expected to fall to slightly below 6 per cent at
end-2004 and further decrease to around 4-5 per cent at
end-2005. This issue of the Report includes forecasts for
2006. According to our calculations, further disinflation
is expected in 2006, with the consumer price index
falling to around 4 per cent towards the end of the
year.10
Next year, the effects of macroeconomic factors con-
tributing to disinflation, the slower increase in wage
costs, the strong exchange rate and more subdued con-
sumption growth, are expected to be offset in part by
certain inflationary shocks, such as rising energy prices.
Disinflation may be more solidly based in 2006, when
the decline in unit labour cost growth, the assumption
of a relatively strong forint exchange rate and the antic-
ipated lower path of oil prices will all exert their effects.
In terms of the uncertainties surrounding our inflation
projection, developments in oil prices, external
demand, and fiscal policy are considered to be the ma-
in sources of risk in 2005. To give an impression of the
dimensions of uncertainty, the expected probability of
an inflation higher than the upper bound of the target
band is nearly 30 per cent. In comparison with the
August Report, the upside risks to inflation have slightly
diminished.
For 2006 the uncertainty surrounding our projections
increases. There is a significant probability (almost 40
percent) that inflation will remain above the 3.5±1
percent target band. This due to the risks associated
with fiscal policy, household consumption and oil
prices.
3.1 OVERVIEW OF PROJECTIONS
10 For further details of the technical features of our projection not detailed in this issue of the Report, including assumptions and the changes compared
to the August report, see chapter 4.2.
11 Since our November Report the fan chart contains only forecast errors, averaging from the introduction of inflation targeting regime, i.e. published infla-
tion forecasts. As forecast errors since 2001 became smaller than the errors prior to 2001, the range of the fan chart has diminished. For general method-
ological details of the fan chart see Chapter 6.7. in our May Report.
The fan chart of inflation*
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In line with earlier practice, the projection is condition-
al. In line with our projection rules, the Report assumes
that the average October 2004 EUR/HUF and
EUR/USD exchange rates and average short-term inte-
rest rate remain unchanged over the entire forecast
period. Based on early November futures quotes, oil
prices are assumed to decline from the current high lev-
els.
With respect to fiscal policy, we provide our own fore-
cast for 2004–2005 in light of the actual budgetary
trends and the proposed budget bill for 2005. With
regard to 2006, however, we presume that the
Government will decrease the deficit by 0.6 per cent of
GDP relative to the previous year, as announced since
the acceptance of the Convergence Programme.12
3.2.1 EXPECTED TRENDS IN THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
The expansion of Hungary’s export markets is expected
continue, as seen in the recent past. The current high
price of oil, associated with the fact that external trade
remains the driving force behind growth in the euro
area and that the expansion of the domestic market
continues to be very moderate, may well be a factor of
risk as far as growth is concerned.
The upswing in external economic activity provides a
conducive environment for Hungarian exports, which –
if coupled with a stable real exchange rate as expected
– may boost market share in line with the trend seen in
recent years and trigger a rise in exports in excess of 10
per cent in the coming years.
Further increase in productive capacities will be
required in order for Hungarian exports of goods to
expand dynamically; however, major capacity enlarge-
ments are not anticipated at this juncture. Although in
our forecast the corporate investment to capital stock
3.2 EXPECTED INFLATION AND ITS DETERMINANTS IN THE MAIN SCENARIO
Table 3.1
2004 2005 2006
EUR/HUF exchange rate (HUF)* 252.0 246.8 246.8
USD/EUR exchange rate (cent)* 123.2 125.0 125.0
Brent oil price (US dollar/barrel)** 38.7 43.9 40.6
Summary table of major assumptions 
determining the central scenario
* Annual average on the basis of the fixed October average.
** Calculated on the basis of early November futures rates for oil (IPE
stock exchange).
12 For more details on the forecast of general government finances, see Chapter 4.2.
Market share and the real exchange rate
2000=100*
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Chart 3.3
8
9
10
11
12
13
95
 Q
1
96
 Q
1
97
 Q
1
98
 Q
1
99
 Q
1
00
 Q
1
01
 Q
1
02
 Q
1
03
 Q
1
04
 Q
1
05
 Q
1
06
 Q
1
Per cent
8
9
10
11
12
13
Per cent
* Corporate investment/corporate capital stock, at constant prices,
own estimate.
43QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION
3 INFLATION OUTLOOK
3
ratio increases slightly compared to the past period, we
do not expect the robust investment behaviour of the
late 1990s to be repeated.
Labour market data indicate a certain degree of easing
from earlier tightness (growth of labour demand and
wage inflation are slowing down). Private sector wage
inflation is projected to slow down and employment to
increase gradually over the forecast period. On the labour
demand side, more sluggish growth in employment rela-
tive to earlier periods is due mainly to a slower increase in
domestic demand, and particularly to declining household
consumption. In the current forecast, due to fiscal consol-
idation, the rate at which public sector employment falls is
similar to that at which private sector employment grows,
and thus whole-economy employment is likely to stag-
nate. At the same time, on the labour supply side, activi-
ties are expected to pick up gradually. Consequently, the
number of unemployed is likely to increase slightly.
Unit wage costs growth is expected to decline steadily,
accompanied by a slowdown in wage inflation and sta-
ble productivity growth. Accordingly, wage inflation is
projected to be 9-10 per cent this year, and around 7-8
per cent in 2005 and 2006 in the private sector.
The increase in government sector wages is expected to
be lower than that in the private sector. Thus, we expect
a gradual slowdown in wage inflation at the whole
economy level, growing around 7–8 per cent, below
the rate of increase in private sector wages. A compari-
son of the expansion of whole-economy productivity
with real wage increase shows that the wage share in
the total economy falls gradually in the current forecast.
The modest increase in real wages relative to recent
years means that, on the average during the coming
years, household real income is likely to increase at a
rate below that of economic growth. However accord-
ing to our calculation, in 2004 real income, containing
also non-wage elements, will grow well faster than the
rate of real wages.13
The rapid rate of other income growth this year may
explain the fact that households’ propensity to consume
(consumption to disposable income) stabilises at rate
above 90 per cent. In 2005–06, this rate is expected to
decline gradually, according to our assessment.
However, while the increase seen in recent years may
have been dramatic in terms of its magnitude, it may
partly be considered as a permanent change.
In the current forecast, the impact of general govern-
ment on business activities is contractionary in 2004
and expansionary in 2005. However, based on the nor-
mative fiscal path, a contractionary impact on demand
is assumed for 2006.
In view of the processes described above, the central
projection is for economic growth of 4 per cent this
year. The sharp upturn in growth relative to last year is
fundamentally explained by buoyant investment activi-
ties. As discussed earlier, a though slowing but dynam-
ic increase in corporate investment is forecasted for the
period ahead. Simultaneously with this, household
investment activity is only expected to slow down
towards year-end. As a result of all these impacts, this
year probably will witness an increase of nearly 10 per
cent in gross fixed capital formation, compared with last
year’s increase of more than 3 per cent. This higher rate
of investment growth will, in turn, boost whole-econo-
my import demand considerably, causing net exports to
make a slightly negative contribution to growth this
year, despite the robust expansion of exports.
For the coming years, a gradual slowdown in economic
growth is expected, approximating the rate of potential
growth estimated to be between 3-4 per cent. Slowing
investment and consumption will play a pivotal role in
Wage inflation and unit wage costs 
in the private sector
Annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates
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13 It is important to note however that CSO actual data concerning households income-balance are only available up to 2002, the 2003 and 2004 H1 are
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data, since then MNB estimates.
44 MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
3 INFLATION OUTLOOK
3
this decline. With the slowdown in domestic absorp-
tion, however, whole-economy import demand is also
likely to fall, allowing external trade to make a positive
contribution to growth.
In the current forecast, the potential rate of economic
growth is estimated to be between 3–4 per cent.14 With
the growth rates assumed in the main scenario, the output
gap is expected to widen from the current level which is
close to zero. This in itself may exert inflationary pressure.
It must be noted, however, that the margin of error in our
estimate of the exact rate of potential growth is relatively
high, therefore, the extent to which the output gap may
widen is surrounded by considerable uncertainty.
3.2.2 DETAILS OF THE MAIN SCENARIO 
INFLATION FORECAST
If the assumptions of the main scenario described
above hold, consumer price inflation will slow to 5.9,
4.4 and 3.9 per cent by the end of 2004, 2005, and
2006, respectively. The projected slowdown towards
end-2004 will be governed essentially by the technical
effect of the inclusion of the robust price rises affecting
regulated products and unprocessed foods into the
base at end-2003.15
In 2005 Q1, both the CPI and core inflation are expect-
ed decelerate considerably, as the impact of increases
in indirect taxes drops out from the base. The drop-off
Economic growth and its components*
Chart 3.6
—4
—2
0
2
4
6
8
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
Per cent
—4
—2
0
2
4
6
8
Per cent
Consumption Investment
Net exports GDP
* Contributions to annual growth of each component  in percentage
points.
Table 3.2
Key projections in the main scenario
* Change in the SNA primary balance, adjusted with the changes in payments to private pension funds.
** In earlier issues of the Report, household real income was approximated by the addition of the net wage bill and social transfers in cash. From
this Report, the primary focus will be on household disposable income.
*** Weighted average of manufacturing and market services.
**** Assumptions based on the Government’s convergence plan.
2003 2004 2005 2006
Economic growth
Household consumption 7.6 3.3 1.8 1.9
Gross fixed capital formation 3.4 9.2 4.2 3.6
Domestic absorption 5.5 4.8 2.5 2.3
Exports 7.6 14.5 11.3 11.0
Imports 10.4 14.8 9.3 9.2
GDP 3.0 4.0 3.7 3.5
General government
Demand impact* -0.5 -0.7 +0.3 -0.7****
Households
Real disposable income of households** 4.3 3.9 3.2 2.3
Labour market
Whole-economy wage inflation 10.9 8.3 7.9 7.3
Whole-economy employment 1.2 -0.4 -0.1 0.5
Unit labour cost (private sector)*** 4.4 5.9 4.4 2.7
14 See Chapter 3.2 in the August Report on this issue.
15 The October 2004 CPI data was published at the time of finalising of the inflation projection. The 6.3 per cent increase in the CPI was in line with our
short-term expectations and thus corroborates our forecast.
45QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION
3 INFLATION OUTLOOK
3
in inflation from 2005 Q2 probably will be fuelled pri-
marily by the decline in the prices of products not cov-
ered by core inflation. In the main scenario, disinflation
will also be facilitated by a decline in oil prices, as they
directly reduce the motor fuel price index. Unprocessed
foods will also exert downward pressure on inflation. As
for regulated prices, above-average price increases are
anticipated.
Core inflation is expected to stagnate or pick-up slightly
in 2005, after the removal of the impact of indirect tax
hikes from the base, with disinflation then resuming in
2006. These changes are a combined result of a num-
ber of factors. The recently high price of oil will proba-
bly gradually feed through to firms’ production costs on
the expenditure side. The related expected energy price
increases will add further inflationary pressure on the
cost side. However, over the entire forecast period dis-
inflation is likely to be supported by the forecast slower
growth rates of unit wage costs and household con-
sumption, and the assumed strong forint exchange rate.
In the long run, our oil price assumption also fosters the
likelihood of a moderation in core inflation, as the drop
in oil prices over the entire horizon will also lower ener-
gy costs in the longer term.
In our assessment, while inflationary effects are slightly
stronger in terms of trend inflation in 2005, disinflation-
ary factors may become dominant from 2006 H2. The
trend inflation indicator is forecast to pick up temporar-
ily up to early 2006, before starting to slow down
markedly.
The above discussion is illustrated using the constant
tax inflation indicator. After a slight increase in 2005, a
considerable slowdown is expected in the CTI in
2006.
Expected developments in trend-inflation*
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Table 3.3
CPI and its major constituents in the main scenario
Year-on-year change, per cent
* For reasons of methodology, the indicator, may, in the short term, be different from the one published by the CSO. Over the longer term, how-
ever, both follow identical trends. 16
2004 2005 2006
Actual Forecast
Q3 Q4 Dec Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Dec Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Dec
CPI 7.0 6.1 5.9 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.0 3.9 3.9
Core inflation* 5.9 5.5 5.4 4.7 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.2 4.2
Unprocessed food 11.9 2.4 1.2 -0.3 -1.6 -4.3 0.2 1.1 2.1 3.3 3.6 3.0 2.9
Motor fuels and 
market-priced energy
Regulated prices 8.3 7.5 7.5 4.9 6.2 7.3 7.2 7.1 5.4 5.1 4.0 4.0 4.0
7.6 11.2 10.5 10.6 9.1 6.3 3.0 1.3 1.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.8
16 The reason for this technical discrepancy is that the core inflation calculated by CSO cannot be accurately reproduced from the published set of CPI
groups, as on the basis of detailed data, CSO publishes several groups in a breakdown of core inflation items and other sub-categories that are exclud-
ed from core inflation (e.g. pharmaceuticals). For this reason in our scenario an approximation is used which, in the long run, closes the gap between
the core inflation values published by the MNB and CSO. More specifically, the core inflation forecast by the MNB covers 67.6 per cent, whereas the one
published by CSO 65.8 per cent of the consumer basket. This, however, leaves the MNB’s forecast for the total CPI unaffected, the only implication be-
ing the reclassification of the categories the MNB uses in its analysis (e.g. regulated prices and core inflation).
Table 3.4
2004 Q4 2005 Q4 2006 Q4
CPI 6.1 4.4 3.9
Constant tax 
consumer price index 4.1 4.4 3.7
Developments in CPI and constant tax consumer
price index in the main scenario*
* Percentage changes on a year earlier.
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The projection for end-2004 consumer prices has been
revised down slightly, mainly as an effect of the actual
data being more favourable than expected. By contrast,
the forecast for December 2005 has remained
unchanged, reflecting an interaction between broadly
equal, but contradictory exogenous effects and less
volatile real economic trends. Regarding the equilibrium
position of the economy, our forecast shows higher de-
ficit now for the budget and also for the current
account.
4.1 BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE PROJECTIONS
17 Unless otherwise indicated, our forecasts are based on information avaible up to 16 November.
Changes in the central scenario relative to August 2004
Percentage changes on a year earlier, unless otherwise indicated
Table 4.1
1 Change in the SNA primary balance, adjusted for changes in payments to private pension funds. Negative values denote tightening. 
2 For the annual average wage inflation in the general government, the thirteenth-month salary for 2004, to be disbursed in January 2005, is includ-
ed in the 2004 wages.
3 Weighted average of manufacturing and market services.
4 CSO Labour Force Survey.
5 In earlier issues of the Report, household real income was approximated by the addition of the net wage bill and social transfers in cash. From
this Report, the primary focus will be on household disposable income.
6 Assumption based on the Convergence Programme.
4.1.1 CHANGES IN THE NOVEMBER PROJECTION RELATIVE TO AUGUST 2004
2003 2004 2005 2006
Actual Projection
August 2004 Current August 2004 Current Current
Consumer price index (CPI)
December 5.7 6.1 5.9 4.4 4.4 3.9
Annual average 4.7 6.9 6.8 4.5 4.5 4.2
Economic growth
External demand (GDP-based) 0.5 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.1 2.2
Household consumption 7.6 2.2 3.3 2.5 1.8 1.9
Memo: Household consumption expenditure 8.1 2.9 3.6 3.0 2.3 2.1
Fixed capital formation 3.4 11.4 9.2 3.9 4.2 3.6
Domestic absorption 5.4 4.4 4.8 2.8 2.5 2.3
Exports 7.6 12.2 14.5 9.5 11.3 11.0
Imports 10.4 12.3 14.8 8.2 9.3 9.2
GDP 3.0 3.8 4.0 3.6 3.7 3.5
Current account deficit
As a percentage of GDP 9.0 8.8 9.0 8.0 8.6 7.9
EUR billion 6.6 7.2 7.3 7.0 7.7 7.5
General government
ESA-deficit 6.2 5.4 5.6 4.96 5.5 4.9
Demand impact1 (-0.5) (-1.7) (-0.7) (-0.3)6 (+0.3) (-0.7)6
Labour market
National economy total wage inflation2 10.9 9.5 8.3 8.5 7.9 7.3
National economy total employment 1.2 0.5 -0.4 0.2 -0.1 0.5
Private sector wage inflation3 8.7 10.2 9.4 9.2 8.3 7.8
Private sector unit labour cost3 4.4 5.9 5.9 4.8 4.4 2.7
Private sector employment4 0.7 1.1 0.0 0.4 0.8 0.8
Household real income5 4.3 4.1 3.9 5.4 3.2 2.3
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Changes in the main scenario
As exchange rate volatility has been low in the past
three months, fluctuations in the exchange rates used in
our scenario (EUR/HUF, EUR/USD) have no direct sig-
nificant influence on the deviation of the current fore-
cast compared to the August Report.
For oil, however, futures prices suggest a considerable
shift in the presumed developments in oil prices. We
decided against taking the average futures price of oil in
October as our basis, as – given the price develop-
ments in November – we arrived at the conclusion that
the very sharp increases in October broadly reflected
transitory effects. As a consequence, we decided to
take as a basis the average futures price of the 10 trad-
ing days preceding the finalisation of our projection.
Also, it should be noted that, as a characteristic feature of
most commodities which are traded on futures markets,
the changes triggered in futures prices by fluctuations in
the spot price are far more powerful in the short than in
the long term. In this particular case, in technical terms
such changes may even have a negative (i.e. inflation
reducing) primary effect on the annual indices over the
longer term, despite the increase in their expected level.
The 2005 budget bill, submitted to Parliament provides
for no rise in the excise duty on alcoholic drinks and
tobacco next year. As the Banks’ earlier projections
assumed a gradual rise in the excise duty within the frame-
work of tax harmonisation, this proposal has led us to
revise the projection towards lower inflation. However,
the assumed effects on regulated prices (energy and pub-
lic transport prices) of the significant rises in oil prices had
an opposite effect on the inflation projection.
Changes to the real economic projection
The rate of GDP growth 2004 Q2 was in line with the
implicit estimations underlying the projection published
in the August Report. The structure of growth, however,
revealed that a number of effects considered in our pro-
jections only as risks actually materialised. Whereas
household consumer demand rose faster than expect-
ed, the correction to the salient outturn for 2004 Q1
corporate capital expenditure exceeded our expecta-
tions.
As wage inflation data are slightly more favourable than
anticipated, our assessment of the corporate sector’s
short-term wage-setting behaviour has been altered.
However, in addition to the revision applied to the
assessment of short-term trends due to seasonal adjust-
ment, some relaxation of the assumption related to
scarce labour market reserves justifies our forecast of
slower wage growth in the long term.
Taken together, our projection for 2004 GDP growth
has been revised up slightly as a result of the above-
mentioned factors (i.e. a faster increase in household
consumption, coupled with slower corporate invest-
ment). Our projection for 2005 GDP growth has been
raised as a consequence of an expected stronger
improvement in net exports.
Changes to the inflation projection
Inflation in the central projection for December 2004
has been lowered by 0.2 percentage points relative to
August, while the projection for end-2005 has been left
unchanged. The short-term scenario has been lowered
because of slightly better-than-expected 2004 Q3 data,
while the longer-term projection has remained
unchanged as a result of offsetting effects.
The third-quarter outturn for core inflation was slightly
below our expectation, particularly as a consequence of
the benign September data. This difference is thought to
have been caused by the stronger-than-expected disinfla-
tion trend underway since mid-2004, affecting all goods
and services used in the measurement of core inflation.
In addition to this factor, lower-than-anticipated
unprocessed food prices also contributed to the
Changes in the major assumptions of the central scenario relative to August
Table 4.2
August 2004 Current projection Change 
projection (percentage)
2004 2005 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005
EUR/HUF exchange rate (HUF)* 253.0 249.8 252.0 246.8 246.8 –0.4 –1.2
(Our assumption **) (249.8) (249.8) (246.8) (246.8) (246.8) –1.2 –1.2
EUR/USD exchange rate (cent)* 122.7 122.7 123.2 125.0 125.0 0.3 1.8
(Our assumption ***) (122.7) (122.7) (125.0) (125.0) (125.0) 1.8 1.8
Brent oil (US dollar / barrel) 36.1 36.2 38.7 43.9 40.6 7.2 21.3
Memo: Price of Brent oil (HUF per barrel) 7429 7364 7890 8676 8014 6.2 17.8
* Annual average exchange rate. Calculated by using actual data up to 2004 Q3 and assumed October values for later periods.
** Average of the daily closing rates of the last full month immediately preceding the publication of this Report (i.e. in this case October 2004)
over the forecast horizon.
*** Calculated using actual data up to Q3 2004 and assumed early average November futures price path for later periods.
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favourable outcome for consumer price inflation.
Although the first-round effects of high global oil prices
are expected to pass through to domestic inflation over
the near term, even these influences, increasing inflation
directly, are unlikely to offset the decline caused by the
low September outturn during the remainder of the year.
The oil price increases assumed in our central scenario
fundamentally affect our projection for 2005. On an
annual average, our projection for consumer prices rises
should have been raised by 0.5 per cent from the pro-
jection published in the previous Report, due to the indi-
rect effects of oil price increases on regulated prices and
core inflation. As, however, the 2005 budget bill propos-
es no rise in the excise duty on alcoholic drinks and
tobacco, and inflationary pressure has declined as a
result of lower unit wage costs and lower consumption,
the price raising effect of this factor has been almost
completely offset. Over the longer term, our assumption
of a slightly stronger EUR/HUF exchange rate is also a
factor contributing to the decline in inflation.
4.1.2 IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE INTEREST 
RATE AND EXCHANGE RATE ASSUMPTIONS 
ON OUR PROJECTION
Alternative interest rate and exchange rate paths, differ-
ent from our technical assumption, and their possible
effects on the inflation projection were discussed in the
August Report for the first time. This issue of the Report
presents a similar analysis. Our alternative interest rate
and exchange rate assumptions have been derived on
the basis of the arithmetic average of responses by
macroanalysts polled by Reuters in October. (As no sur-
vey has been conducted on 2006 to date, we have
used the average of forecasts for year-end 2005 in order
to estimate the path for 2006.)
In analysts’ consensus forecast, the exchange rate is weak-
er by more than 2 per cent in 2005 relative to our techni-
cal assumption. In addition, analysts questioned by Reuters
expect the official interest rate to be nearly 2.5 percentage
points lower at year-end 2005 than its current level.
The combination of these two factors, both pointing to
a higher inflation forecast, would raise our forecast of
average inflation in 2005 by approximately 0.2 percent-
age points compared with the central projection.
4.1.3 PROJECTIONS BY THE MNB VERSUS OTHER
INSTITUTIONS18
Comparing the current projection with those of other
institutions and market analysts, it can be seen that our
forecast of the cyclical position of the economy and the
underlying trends in inflation are essentially in line with
the opinions expressed by other analysts and researchers.
By contrast, we forecast higher budget and current
account deficits relative to average market expectations.
As the September 2004 data have turned out to be mo-
re favourable than either the MNB or the market ana-
lysts expected, we have lowered our projection of De-
cember 2004 consumer prices, as suggested by market
consensus, although more slightly. Consequently, our
short-term projection is exactly on the average of mar-
ket forecasts. Our longer-term projection was centrally
positioned in the range of market projections already in
August. As no change has been made to our projection
for end-2005 and the market consensus has not
changed much either our current projection corre-
sponds to the market average.
Interest rate path based on the Reuters survey
and the assumption of a constant interest rate
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18 Please, note that the MNB projections cannot fully be compared to the projections of other institutions. Our projections are conditional, whereas other
institutions usually present unconditional projections. In addition to the difference between the assessment of current and expected trends, the divergence
between the MNB and other institutions may also stem from the disparity of our central scenario from other institutions’ projections on variables exoge-
nous from our perspective.
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With regard to the growth of Hungary’s export mar-
kets, international forecasters are more optimistic than
the MNB. It should be noted, though, that these insti-
tutes update their forecasts only twice a year, which
entail slower reaction to the latest information. There
is, however, virtually no difference between forecasts
for the 2004 and 2005 growth rate of Hungary’s main
trading partners’ GDP. There is a small difference in
the figures for 2006, in that the OECD is more opti-
mistic than either the European Commission or the
MNB.
Our expectations for GDP growth in 2004 are slightly
higher than the market consensus, but our projection
of 2005 GDP growth is among the lower ones
reviewed.
Our current account deficit projections for both years
remain higher than the market consensus; however, it is
important to note that market analysts and researchers
have revised their forecasts on the period far more than
we have, and by now some projections have become
even more pessimistic than ours in terms of both 2004
and 2005.
The November Report contains, for the first time, the
staff’s projection of the 2005 general government defi-
cit. Our projection exceeds the market consensus for
2005. Although our projections for 2004 are also high-
er than the market average, it should also be noted that
market analysts’ projections have in the past converged
with ours as they have raised the projected deficit as the
end of the year draws nearer.
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MNB’s main scenario in comparison to other projections*
Table 4.3
* MNB projections are conditional; and thus cannot be directly compared to others’ projections.
1 For the Reuters and the Consensus Economics Surveys we show the range of forecasts by indicating the minimum and maximum values in addition to
the averages.  
2 As in ‘Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts’ by Consensus Economics Inc. (London) the current account projections are given in USD, they have been
converted at the annual average of a conditional EUR/USD exchange rate applied in this Report. 
3 Assumption based on the Convergence Programme.
Sources: Consensus Economics Inc. (London) Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts (September 20, 2004); European Commission Economic Forecasts,
Autumn 2004; IMF World Economic Outlook (September 2004); OECD Economic Outlook (October 2004); Reuters survey October 2004; World Bank
EU-8 Quarterly Economic Report (July 2004).
2004 2005 2006
Consumer price index (CPI) (December on December, percentage)
MNB 5.9 4.4 3.9
Reuters survey (October 2004)1 5.7-6.0-6.3 4.0-4.4-5.0 –
Consumer price index (average annual increase, percentage)
MNB 6.8 4.5 4.2
Consensus Economics (September 2004)1 6.5-6.9-7.0 4.0-4.6-5.0 –
European Commission (October 2004) 6.9 4.6 4.2
IMF (September 2004) 6.9 4.4 –
OECD (October 2004) 7.1 4.9 4.5
Reuters survey (October 2004)1 6.5-6.8-6.9 4.3-4.7-5.3 –
World Bank (July 2004) 6.5 4.9 –
GDP (annual growth, percentage)
MNB 4.0 3.7 3.5
Consensus Economics (September 2004)1 3.0-3.8-4.1 2.5-3.8-4.5 –
European Commission (October 2004) 3.9 3.7 3.8
IMF (September 2004) 3.5 3.7 –
OECD (October 2004) 3.8 3.6 3.4
Reuters survey (October 2004)1 3.7-3.9-4.1 3.3-4.0-4.4 –
World Bank (July 2004) 3.2 3.7 –
Current account deficit (EUR billion)
MNB 7.3 7.7 7.5
Consensus Economics (September 2004)1,2 4.1-6.5-8.4 3.3-6.2-7.8 -
Reuters survey (October 2004)1 6.6-7.0-7.4 6.0-6.8-7.8 -
Current account deficit (as a percentage of GDP)
MNB 9.0 8.6 7.9
European Commission (October 2004) 8.7 8.5 8.5
IMF (September 2004)2 8.8 8.2 -
OECD (October 2004) 9.0 8.3 7.8
World Bank (July 2004) 8.2 8.0 –
General government deficit (according to the ESA-95, as a percentage of GDP)
MNB 5.6 5.5 4.93
Consensus Economics (September 2004)1 4.5-5.2-5.6 3.5-4.7-5.5 -
European Commission (October 2004) 5.5 5.2 4.7
OECD (October 2004) 5.6 5.1 4.7
Reuters survey (October 2004)1 5.0-5.4-5.9 4.5-4.9-6.2 –
World Bank (July 2004) 5.2 4.6 –
Change in Hungary’s export market
MNB 5.1 5.8 6.3
European Commission (October 2004) 6.3 6.6 6.5
OECD (October 2004) 6.2 7.1 7.6
IMF (September 2004) 6.4 5.8 -
Change in GDP of Hungary’s foreign trade partners
MNB 1.9 2.1 2.2
European Commission (October 2004) 2.2 2.0 2.1
OECD (October 2004) 2.0 2.1 2.5
IMF (September 2004) 2.1 2.0 –
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The central projection indicates that unless further
measures are taken to reduce the deficit neither the
2004 nor the 2005 deficit targets are likely to be met.
Conditional to our assumptions, the ESA deficit is likely
to stand at 5.6 per cent of GDP this year and at 5.5 per
cent next year.
In spite of the very short horizon, the 2004 central pro-
jection implies significant uncertainty. Some potential,
not yet fully detailed government measures amounting
to  0.4 per cent of GDP may cause deviations from our
2004 central projection. The deficit may be lower than
our central projection if steps taken to tighten control
over VAT refunds are implemented in the case of a wide
range of tax-payers and if such measures put a brake on
refunds well beyond the legal deadlines. On the other
hand, a higher ESA deficit may materialise if no govern-
ment measures are taken to change the expenditure side
before the end of this year in order to respond to appar-
ently higher spending by budgetary units. In both cases,
temporary measures increase uncertainties of the central
projections by switching between certain components
of the deficit between this year and next year without
any changes in the underlying developments. If the
uncertainties of these measures are taken into account,
more accurate information about the ESA deficit will be
available from next March because the ‘fiscal year in
accrual accounting’ will be completed in late February.
Our 2005 projection is based on the amended tax leg-
islation approved by Parliament on 8 November and
the tax legislation adopted already and budget bills sub-
mitted to Parliament. Although the budget bill may
undergo considerable modification before it is passed,
the following analysis is based on the conditions prevail-
ing at the time of submission.19
As there is no approved budget or draft budget for
2006, the central projection is based on the assumption
that, as announced by the Government, the ESA deficit
will decline by 0.6 per cent compared to the deficit in
our central projection in 2005.
It should be noted that, in contrast with previous
announcements, the 2003 general government deficit
on an ESA basis has been raised to -6.2 per cent. That is
a 0.3 percentage point increase from the outturn avail-
able at the time of the August Report. There are funda-
mentally two reasons underlying this difference. First,
the deficit of the local government sub-sector consider-
ably exceeded preliminary data. Second, settlement of
the Russian debt raised the ESA deficit significantly.
4.2 DEVELOPMENTS IN GENERAL GOVERNMENT DEFICIT INDICATORS
19 This chapter is based on information available up to 11 November 2004.
Fiscal indicators
As a percentage of GDP
Table 4.4
2003 2004 2005 2006
Actual/ Central Assumption
estimated projection
1) GFS deficit -5.9 –7.0 –5.4 –4.7
2) ESA adjustments –0.3 +1.4 –0.1 –0.2
3) ESA deficit(1+2) –6.2 –5.6 –5.5 –4.9
4) Adjustment for temporary items –0.9 –1.0 –0.4 –0.3
5) Quasi–fiscal expenditure –1.1 –1.3 –2.2 –2.0
6) Augmented (SNA) deficit (3+4+5) –8.2 –7.9 –8.1 –7.2
7) Augmented (SNA) primary balance –4.4 –3.8 –4.1 –3.4
8) Fiscal demand impact* –0.5 –0.7 +0.3 –0.7
* Changes in the augmented (SNA) primary balance, adjusted for changes in payments to private pension funds. Negative values dentone con-
traction in fiscal demand.
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Assumptions were made on the accrual-based adjust-
ment between the ESA and GFS balances in 2004 and
2005. As a baseline, the adjustments announced by the
Ministry of Finance were applied for both years (+1.4
per cent of GDP in 2004 and -0.1 per cent in 2005). For
the purposes of the 2006 conditional projection, an esti-
mate was made on the basis of past adjustments (-0.2
per cent). The adjustment improves the 2004 ESA bal-
ance to a particularly great degree. This entails certain
methodological risks, which will only be discovered dur-
ing the course of next year.
4.2.1 DETAILS OF THE FISCAL 
BALANCE EXPECTED FOR 2004
Our central projection of the cash-based (GFS) balance
of general government assumes a 0.4 per cent higher
deficit as a percentage of GDP than in the August
Report. The underlying reasons for this higher deficit
include lower-than-expected primary revenue and
developments in primary expenditure in 2004 Q3.
Our central projection actually forecasts the deficit lev-
els that follow from macro-economic and fiscal develop-
ments. Consequently, the expected effects of certain
not yet detailed discretionary measures to be undertak-
en by the Government can only partially be incorporat-
ed in our central projection. Such measures include the
order to tighten controls over VAT refunds related to
the imports of corporations.20
The full effect of this measure may amount to 0.5 per-
centage point of GDP, i.e. under an extreme scenario,
the slowdown or the temporary suspension of VAT
refunding may improve the 2004 GFS-based deficit by
this amount. Only as much of the impact as apparent
on the basis of the data made available before 11 No-
vember by the Treasury has been included in our cen-
tral projection (0.1 per cent of GDP). We should ment-
ion the fact that this measure will not leave the 2005
cash-based deficit unaffected, as the VAT refunds car-
ried forward to next year will reduce the net 2005 cash-
based VAT revenues by an identical amount. This meas-
ure modifies the accrual-based 2004 deficit-account
only if the 45-day period of VAT refunds is not restored
by end of February 2005.
On the revenue side of the central budget, we expect
lower net cash-based revenues than forecast in the
August Report. In 2004 Q3, net VAT revenues fell short
of our expectations: in addition to a slower-than-expect-
ed increase in gross VAT revenues, VAT refunds rose
faster than expected, though a slowdown in VAT
refunds was already apparent in September and
October 2004.
Most of the revenue shortfalls resulting from the modi-
fication of our forecast on VAT revenues in the central
projection are offset by a rise in the payment obliga-
tions of business organisations of the government sec-
tor and public corporations, as a result of new govern-
ment measures adopted after August 2004.
On the expenditure side, we apply the Ministry’s projec-
tions for each expenditure estimate over which the fis-
cal authorities retain certain control. As there is no
essential change in our approach, our forecast of expen-
ditures within this scope relies on the projections of the
Ministry of Finance updated in October 2004.
However, on the basis of data from the first three quar-
ters of 2004, we conclude that in 2004 tension has aris-
en on the expenditure side in excess of 0.5 per cent of
GDP of the budget chapters and budgetary units. As it
is not clear when and to what extent additional expen-
ditures appear in the deficit, most of them are included
among risks. (The annual estimates have been repeated-
ly exceeded in the past too, see box text.) 2004 Q3
developments in the expenditure estimates suggest that
the effects of the spring measures will be felt with a
delay, and that effective expenditure cuts must be
implemented in Q4, if at all. Overall, within the primary
expenditure of the central budget, our current central
projection forecasts actual expenditure to be 0.2 per
cent higher relative to GDP than in the August Report.
As a result of changes in the macro-economic and fiscal
developments, we have revised up our projection for
the deficit of social security funds in the social security
sub-sector relative to the August Report. In particular,
total receipts of social security contributions are expect-
ed to be lower than the projection by the Ministry of
Finance updated in September 2004.
We have prepared no independent estimate for the
accrual-based adjustment between the GFS and the ESA
deficits, owing to the high degree of uncertainty charac-
terising the year of Hungary’s EU accession. We accept
the difference between the accrual-based (GFS) deficit
forecast by the Ministry of Finance and the ESA deficit
targeted by the Ministry of Finance (GFS) deficit, 1.4 per
cent of GDP, as the expected accrual-based adjustment.
It should be noted, however, that regarding the 2003
ESA deficit, compared to preliminary data, the CSO
modified accrual-based adjustment between the cash-
and accrual-based deficits, and this risk also applies to
adjustments to accounts in 2004 (see the following sec-
tion).
Our projection for the 2004 fiscal demand impact has
been considerably revised relative to the August Report,
20 On 19 October 2004, the Ministry of Finance announced that the Minister had ordered the tax authority to ‘perform an item-by-item check of each VAT
return submitted by tax-payers with a European Union tax ID before VAT is refunded, with the help of control information received from the Member
States of the community’. For the full text of the announcement, please see the website of the Ministry of Finance.
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in which we assumed that the government would lower
aggregate demand by 1.7 per cent of GDP. In our cur-
rent estimate, the contraction of government demand
may amount to around 0.7 per cent of GDP in 2004.
This means that the fiscal path we are currently estimat-
ing for 2004 is 1 per cent of GDP looser than the pro-
jection published in the August Report. Changes in our
estimate (the indicator of the fiscal demand impact has
been revised down from -1.7 per cent to -0.7 per cent)
are attributable to several underlying effects. The 2003
fiscal demand impact also changed considerably: first,
we allowed for contraction amounting to 0.1 per cent
of GDP, which we then modified to 0.5 per cent. The
reason for this is that, relying on the data made available
in the meantime, we provided a more precise estimate
for 2003 quasi-fiscal expenditure. Thus, the base effect
added 0.4 percentage point to the revision of our 2004
projection. Our projection for the 2004 GFS deficit is
for a deficit that is 0.4 per cent higher than anticipated
in the August Report. In the primary balance this entails
a 0.3 per cent deterioration, i.e. the change in our cash-
based government deficit projection eases fiscal
demand to this extent. Increase in quasi-fiscal activities,
especially the advance payment of the agricultural sub-
sidies related to both EU and national funds, further
eases fiscal demand, while quasi-fiscal investment activ-
ity will be more moderate than we had assumed. Thus,
overall, net quasi-fiscal expenditure that we have taken
into consideration may increase demand by 0.3 per
cent of GDP in the economy.
4.2.2 UNCERTAINTY OF THE 2004 FORECAST
In this section, we present all of the risk factors which
are attributable to autonomous macroeconomic and fis-
cal developments, but which our central projection can-
not allow for when we calculate the main scenario. The
following table reveals that an asymmetric risk domain
can be assigned to the 5.6 per cent GDP-proportionate
ESA deficit assumed in our central projection. Based on
our forecast, the Government’s modified projection for
the 2004 GFS and ESA deficits can be achieved only if
spending by budgetary units and chapters is kept under
full control for the rest of the year and, in comparison
to the delays seen as of 11 November 2004, the tax
authority further improves the net VAT revenues of the
budget by delaying VAT refunds. With regard to the
methodological bridge between the 2004 GFS and the
ESA accounts, we anticipate an upward one-way risk
approximating 0.5 per cent of GDP to the ESA deficit.
In comparison to our central projection, the tightening
of tax controls related to imports may improve the 2004
GFS-based balance by 0.4 percentage points of GDP.
The effects of this measure could already be seen in
early November: VAT refunds slowed down consider-
ably. This measure will actually decrease the ESA deficit
only if its effects last until late February, which can first
be assessed only in March21.
As indicated in our central projection, during the year
spending by the budget chapters and budgetary units
invariably exceeded the Ministry of Finance’s annual
expenditure appropriation on a time-proportionate
basis. According to our estimates, expenditure overruns
by budgetary units generated a budget factor exceed-
ing HUF 100 billion during the year. In our opinion, it
will be more difficult to hold expenditure overruns in
check by discretionary measures than it used to be,
because overspending follows from the fact that a con-
Factors of uncertainty in the GFS and ESA deficit projection for 2004
As a per cent of GDP
Table 4.5
Central projection of GFS deficit:  -7.0 per cent
Slowdown in VAT refunds due to stricter checks by the APEH 0.4 Higher expenditure overruns incurred by budgetary units 
and local governments –0.4
Delay in implementation of investment projects 0.1 Higher-than-expected increase in some items 
of open-end expenditure –0.1
Extra revenues in corporate tax 0.1 Lower-than-expected direct tax revenues –0.1
Higher surplus in extra-budgetary funds than expected 
in the central projection (Research Fund) 0.1
GFS deficit under a best case scenario –6.3 GFS deficit under a worst case scenario –7.6
GFS – ESA bridge assumption: +1.4
Uncertainty surrounding the methodological 
bridge between the GFS and ESA deficits –0.5
ESA-deficit under a best case scenario –4.9 ESA deficit under a worst case scenario –6.7
21 According to the adapted cash-adjusted method of the accrual accounting the revenues paid in January and the refunds paid in January-February are
adjusted backwards to the previous year. This is in line with the principles of the Eurostat. This means that at the time of the first announcement of the
preliminary ESA deficit, which is expected to take place in January, the VAT figures of January-February will not be available. This uncertainty will dis-
appear only later, when the CSO reports preliminary ESA figures for 2004 (probably in March 2005). Thus, the first announcement of the 2004 deficit
probably in January will not be necessarily fully informative.
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siderable portion of the carry-over funds from previous
years is actually encumbered by payment commit-
ments. Therefore, unless further measures aimed at
reducing expenditure are taken, budgetary units are
likely to generate excess expenditure amounting to 0.4
per cent of GDP in 2004 or 2005.
Past experience with expenditure overruns by budg-
etary units
In the 1980s, budgetary units were relieved of the pre-
vious tightly restrictive budgetary system. The
Government wished to alleviate the permanent fund-
ing shortages by allowing greater institutional inde-
pendence. Increased institutional independence
served the purpose of pushing institutions to rely on
less central funds in performing their tasks. This result-
ed in loose fiscal discipline.
Expenditure of budgetary units and chapters (min-
istries and institutions under their control) has exceed-
ed the estimates approved by Parliament every single
year. The planning circulars issued year after year kept
highlighting the tasks and the institutional systems of
the individual chapters from the point of view of effi-
ciency and economy, and the establishment of the
required legislative framework in order to align duties
with the available funds. As no decisions were in effect
made, the problems arising from the lack of a solid
foundation in the budget entailed the need for across-
the-board adjustments and reduced the efficiency of
implementation.
The limits were exceeded primarily in the cases of
open-ended estimates (transfers to non-profit organisa-
tions, increased normative subsidy to church institu-
tions, social and educational contributions in kind,
compensations, etc.). The reasons for significant
excess expenditure included a major interim pay rise
to civil servants in 2001 and a 50 per cent increase in
public servants’ wages in 2002 Q4, covered by the
Government from extra revenues at that time.
Simultaneously, the already substantially increased
carry-over funds in investment and subsidy estimates
continued to accumulate.
Excess spending was covered from additional rev-
enues, central reserves and previously accumulated
carry-over funds. Budgetary units’ significantly
increased expenditure led to a larger-than-planned de-
ficit.
In order to keep the budget within the estimates, the
Government decided to take measures to cut expen-
diture and freeze carry-overs in the course of 2004. It
remains to be seen, however, whether these decisions
can be carried out–whether or not this move was suc-
cessful will only be seen in December 2004.
The risk posed by the bridge between the GFS and
ESA deficits is that it is still uncertain how CSO and
EUROSTAT will handle factoring related to agricultur-
al subsidies. Moreover, it is also uncertain whether the
accrual-basis adjustment of the 13th-month salary
payable in the public sector will actually be equal to
the amount anticipated by the Ministry of Finance.
Overall, such methodology-related risk is estimated to
amount to 0.5 per cent of GDP, which means that
under an unfavourable scenario, correction of the
2004 cash-based deficit will be a mere 1 per cent of
GDP. As the 2004 ESA deficit will be announced offi-
cially in the autumn of 2005, following a so-called fis-
cal notification of the preliminary data, these uncer-
tainties will only be treated in the longer run.
Box 4.1
Chart 4.3
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4.2.3 FISCAL BALANCE EXPECTED FOR 2005
As there is no approved budget for 2005, our central
projection is even more conditional than usual. It is
based on the modified tax bills approved in November
and the assumption that the budget bill submitted to the
Parliament will be passed with its original contents. The
central projection is governed by the principle that we
accept the projections of the Ministry of Finance for
each expenditure appropriation item over which fiscal
authorities have some control.
Announced simultaneously with the submission of the
budget bill, the net HUF 100 billion expenditure reserve
set aside is taken into account in our projection as defin-
itively frozen, of which, however, only approximately
HUF 80 billion is considered as effective. It follows from
our rule-based projection that blocking the portion of
personal income tax revenue due to local governments
and assigned to them by the central government cannot
be considered as effective because local governments
do not necessarily adjust to shrinking central subsidies.
Under our main scenario, unless further government
measures are taken, in 2005 the general government
cash-based deficit is likely to exceed the amount speci-
fied in the budget bill by near 0.8 per cent of GDP.
Regarding direct taxes, social security revenues in par-
ticular are assumed to be lower than targeted in the
budget bill. The difference is due primarily to the fact
that considerably lower revenues are expected to be
raised in this tax category in 2004 already.
In respect of indirect taxes, our projection for VAT rev-
enues is 0.2 percentage point of GDP lower than spec-
ified in the submitted draft budget. One fundamental
reason for this is the change in the estimate of the base
period VAT revenues: we expect lower net VAT rev-
enues in 2004 than forecast by the Ministry of Finance
at the time of preparing the draft budget.
On the expenditure side, expenditure overruns by local
governments (e.g. capital expenditure and purchase of
goods and services) and the social security sub-sector
(e.g. old-age pensions and pharmaceuticals) are expect-
ed. In the case of old-age pensions, the difference stems
from the fact that our macro-economic projection
assumes higher wage growth than the Ministry of
Finance. In consequence, our index for the rise in old-
age pensions in 2005 is 1.5 percentage points higher
than that specified in the budget bill.
We have accepted all of the items of the expenditure
reserve set aside by the government which refer to the
freezing some of the expenditure-side appropriations.
We considered some 80 per cent of the measure as
effective, and included this in the main scenario as a
deficit reducing factor.
Our net interest expenditure projection is significantly
higher than what is set forth in the draft Budget Act (by
some 0.3 per cent of GDP). In compliance with our fore-
casting rules, unchanged monetary policy is assumed
over the entire forecast horizon. Accordingly, our inte-
rest projection is based on the forward yield curve effec-
tive at the time of closing our projection calculations,
with the financing plan of ÁKK (the Government Debt
Management Agency) taken into consideration.
In summary, using a different decomposition, the cen-
tral government deficit anticipated in our main scenario
exceeds the draft budget projection by 0.25 per cent of
GDP. Our central projection for the deficit of the social
security sub-sector is 0.3 per cent higher as a proportion
of GDP than specified in the budget bill. Our annual
central scenario projects a deficit generated by local
governments and extra-budgetary funds exceeding that
specified in the budget bill by 0.2 per cent of GDP.
The expenditure tension of central budgetary units is
discussed in detail in the section on 2004. Since at the
moment it is not clear which fiscal year’s (2004 or
2005) account will be debited by the amount of the
accumulated potential of expenditure overruns, this
item is not included in our central scenario; rather, this
item is one of the uncertainties (pointing towards a
higher 2005 deficit) surrounding our 2005 projection.
Based on the projection the MNB provides for macro-
economic growth, GDP at current prices in 2005 is
expected to be approximately HUF 230 billion lower
than assumed by the Ministry of Finance at the time of
drafting the budget. As a result of this difference, the
nominal cash-based deficit forecast in the budget bill gen-
erates a higher, -4.7 per cent deficit rate in its own right.
Differences between our projection 
and the budget bill
Cash-based, as a per cent of GDP
Table 4.6
Difference from 
the draft 
budget (per cent)
I. Revenues (1+2+3) –0.44
1) Direct taxes –0.37
2) Indirect taxes –0.17
3) Other revenues +0.10
II. Primary expenditure (4+5) +0.03
4) Primary expenditures –0.33
5) Expenditure reserves (freezes) +0.36
Primary balance (I+II) –0.41
6) Interest balance –0.29
7) Technical effects of differences 
in the GDP projection –0.05
Differences total (I+II+6+7) –0.75
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Our estimate for the fiscal demand impact indicates 0.3
per cent of GDP demand expansion effect. The reason
for the considerable relaxation in fiscal demand is that the
overwhelming majority of government fixed investment
implemented under PPP (Public-Private Partnerships)
schemes are recorded in ESA and GFS deficit categories
only in part or not at all. The total amount of investment
expenditure implemented under PPP schemes is likely to
be close to HUF 300 billion in 2005, i.e. 1.4 per cent of
GDP next year. (As our earlier projections already con-
tained some estimation of public investment, the effects
of the increase in PPP-type investment lead to only minor
revision in our demand impact forecast.)
An alternative presentation of our projection for 2005:
a comparison of previously identified determinations
and measures incorporated in tax and budget bills
The normative assumption for 2005 was augmented by
a risk-based projection in the August Report, as there
was no specific budget proposal or bill at that time. On
the basis of trends and well-known determinations and
the assumption of unchanged fiscal policy we identified
a risk that the deficit may be higher by more than 1 per
cent of GDP compared to 2004.
The effects of several deficit-increasing determinations
were offset by the approved changes in the tax bills in
November and the proposed measures incorporated
into the budget bill. Hence, our central projection con-
tains an improvement in the balance for 2005.
Table 4.7 shows how the effects of determinations were
corrected by the government. The table gives a summa-
ry of the most important measures: some previous deci-
sions were annulled (delaying the reduction of the
lump-sum health contribution and the implementation
of some NATO requirements), introduction of new
measures (limits on the PIT tax benefits) and outsourc-
ing public investment (mainly road construction) into
PPP schemes (see the macro-economic considerations
of PPPs in Chapter 4.4). These measures offset the
effect of the higher base year deficit, which would have
increased the deficit in itself.
Major measures of the government compared to the previous determinations in order 
to decrease deficit in 2005*
Table 4.7
Determinations were Effects of measures on
known in August determinations and deficit**
Revenues
Drop in lump-sum health contributions Significant shortfall in tax revenues Change in tax bill: higher  revenues (+)
Shortfall in customs revenues Reduction in tax revenues Unchanged
VAT revenues Above neutral Change in tax bill: higher revenues (+)
Excise duties Neutral Change in tax bill: lower revenues (-)
Social security contributions Slightly above neutral Unchanged
Corporate taxes Neutral Unchanged
Personal income tax Neutral Change in tax bill: lower revenues (-)
Other taxes payable Neutral Change in tax bill: higher revenues (+)
Own revenues by local governments Neutral Unchanged 
Expenditures
NATO liabilities Higher than neutral Budget proposal: lower expenditures (+)
Increase in the 13th-month pension Higher than neutral Unchanged
Effects of EU-funds Higher than neutral Unchanged
Investment cycle of local governments Neutral Unchanged
The effects of 13th-month wage payment 
on wage-related expenditure Higher than neutral Unchanged
Subsidies to budgetary units Neutral Budget proposal: lower expenditures (+)
Motorway construction Known determinations Budget proposal: lower on-budget
expenditures (due to PPP) (+)
Pensions (rises in survivor’s pension) Neutral Unchanged
Expenditure related to pharmaceuticals Lower than neutral Unchanged
Expenditure freeze n/a Budget proposal: lower expenditures (+)
Base (2004 deficit) n/a Towards higher deficit (-)
Combined impact on deficit 
in 2005 compared to 2004: Deficit increases Deficit drops slightly
Based on the information available on 11 November.
* Neutral: remains stable (i.e. equal to previous year’s figure) as a percentage of GDP.
** Bold: differences between previous determinations and new measures incorporated into tax and budget bills, their effects on the budget bal-
ance are between brackets (“+” indicates a deficit reduction).
In the risk-based projection published in August 2004, a
reduction in lump-sum health contributions was taken
into account, as usual, from the beginning of 2005, sim-
ilarly to changes in other tax categories.  Now the
reduction is planned to start late in 2005.
In terms of personal income tax the current central pro-
jection is based on a quantification of the approved
amendments of the tax legislation, implying a drop in
tax revenues compared to the neutral case.
With regard to excise duties, we assumed valorisation
of tax items. In the case of tobacco, we considered the
rise in excise duties in line with the 2005 inflation pro-
jection. The tax legislation adopted contains no such
increase in excise duty next year, implying lower rev-
enue.
For other taxes we assumed a GDP-proportionate
increase in revenues in our August projection, whereas
our current scenario quantifies the effects of approved
amendments in the tax legislation, therefore a higher
than GDP-proportionate increase is expected in the
case of some of these taxes.
On the expenditure side, the risk-based August project-
ion reckoned with a GDP-proportionate increase in the
transfers paid to budgetary units, because at that time
the draft budget had not been disclosed.
Based on the agreement concluded with NATO, our
risk-based August projection assumed a rise in defence
expenditure in excess of the rate of GDP-growth, as
Hungary failed to meet the long-term obligations in
2003. On a rule basis, our August projection assumed
that the payment liability undertaken to NATO as a per-
centage of the prevalent GDP would be fully met. The
November 2004 central projection specifies this expen-
diture item in line with the submitted draft budget.
According to the opinion of the State Audit Office, dis-
closed in October 2004, the level of defence spending
remains considerably below the obligation undertaken
in the agreement concluded with NATO.22
4.2.4 UNCERTAINTY OF THE 2005 FORECAST
Our risk assessment for 2005 contains more uncertain-
ties than usual. One is that the bills submitted to
Parliament are still subject to change before they are
passed, which is an important risk factor. Another is that
the 2004 base is still unknown, and the uncertainties
surrounding our 2004 projections are rather significant
in terms of both revenues and expenditure. Third, risks
to 2005 macro-economic developments carry further
uncertainty. Of the risks likely to materialise in 2005,
major ones include those surrounding expenditure.
Overall, there is a significant risk towards a higher-than-
forecast 5.5 per cent of GDP ESA deficit in 2005.
Although we see no quantifiable risk to the adjustment
to methodological bridge between GFS and ESA deficits
as forecast by the Ministry of Finance, it should be
noted that in the case of quasi-fiscal expenditure, the
risk of recording it above the line (i.e. as a deficit-gener-
ating transaction) still applies. Such risks are especially
significant if certain capital expenditure items are not
spent in a PPP scheme, and government spending takes
the form of deferred payment. This is a risk towards a
higher deficit, though it will be uncovered only in the
longer run due to the characteristics of ESA statistics.
The deviations in 2005 macro-economic developments
from the central projection alone indicate a symmetric
distribution of uncertainty around next year’s fiscal bal-
ance. In our estimate, the changes in macro-economic
developments may modify the 2005 general govern-
ment deficit by 0.2 per cent of GDP in comparison to
our central projection.
The 2004 developments in VAT revenues pose consid-
erable risks to the projection of the net VAT revenues in
2005. VAT revenues, after dropping in 2004 due to
Hungary’s accession to the European Union, must also
return to normal on a cash basis in 2005 so that the rev-
enues assumed in our central scenario can materialise.
Even if the one-off technical effects of accession are dis-
regarded, net 2004 VAT revenues fell short of our
expectations. In our central scenario, we assume that –
apart from those caused by accession effects – at least
half the amount of the 2004 shortfall in VAT revenues
will not be repeated in 2005. As our projection for the
2005 VAT revenues is included as a central projection,
the distribution of risks is symmetrical.
Tightening VAT refund control in 2004 increases the
risk of meeting the 2005 net VAT revenue target as the
refunds will be carried forward from 2004 to the debit
of the 2005 net VAT revenues. If next year more strin-
gent checks by the tax authority result in a more lasting
extension of the 45-day VAT refund period (and this
procedure will is not completed in February 2005), this
will entail a rise in the ESA deficit.
The risk posed by expenditure overruns by budgetary
units also depends, for the most part, on actual 2004
expenditures. In order to achieve the 2004 deficit tar-
get, fiscal authorities have some leeway to take discre-
tionary measures to stop overspending in the central
budget through assigning higher amounts of carry-over
funds to lower 2004 expenditure. Under such a sce-
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22 According to the State Audit Office the difference in defence expenditure amounts to approximately HUF 100 billion, see p. 62 in the Appendix to the
State Audit Office’s Report on the On-Site Inspection of the 2005 Draft Budget of the Republic of Hungary.
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nario, the fiscal authorities would deliberately carry the
negative effects of this year’s developments forward to
the next. In this case, the risk of exceeding the 2005
expenditure appropriations by at least 0.4 per cent of
GDP would significantly increase. 
Local governments’ expenditure overruns can be attrib-
uted to the effects of the election cycle. Usually, in the
year before local elections, their investment activity
increases, engendering a risk of higher local govern-
ment deficit in 2005.
Overall, there is a significant risk of a higher-than-pro-
jected deficit in 2005.
4.2.5 FISCAL BALANCE EXPECTED FOR 2006 
AND RELATED UNCERTAINTY
As there is no approved budget or detailed budget bill
for 2006, we have prepared a normative (conditional)
and a risk-based projection for 2006 as in the previous
Report for 2005. The purpose of the risk-based pro-
jection is to use current determinants in outlining an
alternative path that shows developments in the gen-
eral government balance over a 2-year horizon with-
out further fiscal policy measures (especially the 2006
budget) taken. The conditional projection constitutes
the central projection in the Report, while the differ-
ence between our risk-based projection and the nor-
mative path represents the risk to reduction in the de-
ficit (0.6 per cent of GDP) along the targeted norma-
tive path.
The normative path is based on the assumption that, in
line with the government’s announcements of the fiscal
path, the ESA deficit will decline by 0.6 percentage
points per year in 2006.23
Already legislated items, other determinations and past
trends, detailed below, imply a rise of roughly 1 per
cent in the deficit in 2006. The difference between the
scenario and the government plan of a 0.6 per cent de-
ficit reduction indicates that further measures amount-
ing to 1.5 per cent of GDP will probably be needed to
improve the fiscal balance in 2006.
Our risk-based scenario assumes complete termination
of lump sum health contributions from early 2006, and
payment of the full 13th-month pension.
In the case of non-tax revenues we assume a decrease
as a percentage of GDP. Extra revenue from the dis-
posal of real assets owned by the Treasury and the
state, and payments from some state-owned enterpris-
es is not assumed to be achieved again, because the
stock of real assets which can be sold at a market
price is significantly diminished and further receipts
from those state-owned enterprises would result in
insufficient funds for undertaking necessary invest-
ment.
In terms of the GFS balance, the assumed risk-based path
reckons with an increase in fixed investment amounting
to 0.4 per cent of GDP, owing to an agreement conclud-
ed with the European Union on the additionality of
investment expenditure.24 Under our calculations, the fi-
xed investment recognised in the 2005 budget balance
does not guarantee the implementation of the above-
mentioned agreement, and therefore extra investment
expenditure amounting to 0.4 per cent of GDP will need
to be appropriated on the expenditure side of the 2006
budget. In view of the overall effects of the 2005 meas-
ures (and especially in the case of public wage expendi-
ture), subsidies paid to budget institutions will increase
slower than the GDP-proportionate level in 2006.
Expected developments in fiscal indicators in 2006
As a per cent of GDP
Table 4.8
1 2 1-2
Deficit indicator Risk-based projection Central projection Risk
(assumption)
GFS deficit –6.2 –4.7 –1.5
ESA deficit –6.4 –4.9
Augmented (SNA) deficit –8.7 –7.2
23 The normative (conditional) 2006 path is calculated with a demand impact of -0.7 per cent, since the decline in the interest balance contributes to
reduction in deficit in a similar amount as does the technical adjustment between the GFS and ESA deficit settlements (i.e. the ESA deficit would exceed
the GFS balance by -0.2 per cent as a technical assumption).
24 Pursuant to the agreement, in the specified sectors (environment protection, transport etc.) Hungary must achieve the minimum level required as
expenditures relative to GDP on the average of three years. The purpose of the agreement is to ensure that, rather than relying on EU funds or reducing
their expenditure to perform budget adjustment, the new member states actually use up the available extra EU resources as additional sources for pro-
grammes.
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Major factors in the development of a risk-based factor for 2006
Table 4.9
* Neutral: remains stable (i.e. equal to the previous year’s figure) as a percentage of GDP.
Assumption applied in Impact on budget item 
the risk scenario (relative to GDP)*
Revenues
Reduction lump sum health contributions Tax cancelled as of early 2006 Lower than neutral
Shortfall in customs revenues Increases in line with the tax base Neutral
VAT revenues Increases in line with the tax base Lower than neutral
(consumption)
Excise duties Increases in line with the tax base Neutral
Social security contributions Increases in line with the tax base Neutral
Corporate taxes Increases in line with the tax base Neutral
Personal income tax Increases in line with the tax base Lower than neutral
(household income)
Other tax revenues Long-term average Neutral
Other non-tax revenues Returns to long-term average Lower than neutral
Own revenues by local governments As per cycle Lower than neutral
Expenditure
NATO obligations As per obligation Considerably higher than neutral
Increase in 13th-month pension An additional week’s pension Higher than neutral
Pension indexation According to the Swiss index Lower than neutral
Effects of EU-funds Expected on the basis of  agreement Higher than neutral
Investment cycle of local governments As per cycle Higher than neutral
Transfers to budgetary units Adjusted GDP-proportionate increase Lower than neutral
Public fixed investment Effects of obligations undertaken Considerably higher than neutral
in an agreement with the EU
Expenditure related to pharmaceuticals As per 2004 contract Lower than neutral
Combined impact on deficit in 2005 compared to 2004: Increase in the deficit
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The current account deficit reached EUR 2.1 billion in
Q2, while the surplus in the capital account balance
amounted to EUR 80 million. Thus, compared to the
preceding quarter, whole-economy external financing
requirement grew by 0.5 percentage point to 10.3 per
cent as a proportion of GDP. This is slightly higher than
assumed in the previous Report.
The increased borrowing requirement is attributable pri-
marily to a rise in the financing requirement of consolidat-
ed general government and related quasi-fiscal activities.
Based on available data for the first nine months, contrary
to our earlier expectations, the general government bor-
rowing requirement in a broader sense is unlikely to
decline. Accordingly, it is unlikely to contribute to reduc-
tion in the external financing requirement.
Households’ net financial savings rose faster than
expected in Q2, with its seasonally adjusted value, fol-
lowing a historical trough last year, approximating 2 per
cent of GDP in 2004 H1. Following tightening of the
subsidised housing finance scheme at year-end 2003, in
line with our expectations, the number of new housing
loan agreements dropped further in Q2. In contrast to a
slower lending in subsidised housing loans, the portfolio
of foreign currency loans is growing vigorously. In addi-
tion to the higher-than-expected financial savings of
households, the expansion in consumption also exceed-
ed what had been projected, suggesting a rise in the
sector’s disposable income.
The corporate sector’s borrowing requirement was
effected by a number of specific factors related to
Hungary’s EU accession in Q2. The postponement of
the deadline for the payment of VAT on imports as a
one-off transfer added to sectoral income. At the same
time, however, stockbuilding prior to accession led to
an unjustified level of capital formation expenditure.
With one-off effects excluded, owing to increased cor-
porate fixed investment activity, the sector’s borrowing
requirement seems to be rising at a faster-than-expect-
ed rate in 2004, compared to low levels in the preced-
ing two years.
Developments from 2004 to 2006
Under our projection, in 2004 whole-economy borrow-
ing requirement will only slightly exceed earlier expec-
tations. The GDP-proportionate current account deficit
is likely to stand at last year’s approximately 9 per cent,
representing a deficit of EUR 7.3 billion. In 2005, the
GDP-proportionate external borrowing requirement
may decrease by 0.8 percentage point to 7.7 per cent.
As no loss of VAT on imports, equal to 1 per cent of
GDP, will materialise in 2005, the general government
borrowing requirement will fall by 0.5 percentage point
despite a 0.5-percentage point expansion in demand.
Owing to the expected slowdown in GDP-proportion-
ate corporate capital formation, the corporate sector’s
borrowing requirement is not expected to increase.
Households’ net financial savings, by contrast, may con-
tinue to rise. The external financing requirement may
further decline in 2006. However, a pre-condition for
this is that the general government borrowing require-
ment should decrease according to the government
plans. Due to the determinations in government bud-
4.3 DEVELOPMENTS IN EXTERNAL BALANCE
Current account and net lending of the economic sectors
As a per cent of GDP
Table 4.10
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Estimate Projection
I. General government –5.0 –9.2 –8.5 –8.5 –8.0 –7.3
II. Private sector (=1+2) –0.7 2.3 –0.5 0.1 0.3 0.6
1. Household sector 5.1 2.7 0.2 2.1 2.6 2.9
2. Corporate sector –5.8 –0.4 –0.7 –2.0 –2.3 –2.3
Financing requirement (=I+II) –5.6 –6.9 –9.0 –8.5 –7.7 –6.8
Current account balance –6.3 –7.2 –9.0 –9.0 –8.6 –7.9
– EUR billions 3.6 5.0 6.6 7.3 7.7 7.5
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get, futher considerable measures are needed to reduce
the government deficit, therefore the risk of develop-
ment of higher-than-expected deficit is significant.
4.3.1 FINANCING THE CURRENT 
ACCOUNT DEFICIT
In 2004 Q2, the whole-economy external financial
requirement of EUR 2 billion was met almost entirely
through borrowing abroad by the private sector and,
within this, predominantly by the banking sector. Strong
borrowing abroad by the banking sector was associated
with a sharp increase in foreign currency lending to the
domestic corporate and household sectors.
Following a jump in Q1, the stock of Hungarian govern-
ment securities held by non-residents fell by nearly EUR
500 million in Q2. This loss was partially offset by non-
residents’ purchases of approximately EUR 300 million
worth of mortgage bonds.
Compared to the previous quarter, FDI slightly
declined. The main underlying reason for this is the sea-
sonality of the statistical reporting of re-invested earn-
ings. In consequence, the proportion of net FDI in
financing the current account shrank from 25 per cent
in Q1 to 13 per cent. Even so, 18 per cent in H1 still
exceeds the value in the corresponding period in 2003.
The ratio of  net FDI inflows to the current account de-
ficit is likely to rise in H2 as well. Thus, the nearly 30 per
cent weight of non-debt generating financing, including
share purchases, in H1 is expected to grow further.
External financing requirement
EUR billions
Table 4.11
2003 2003 2004 2004
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Year Q1 Q2
Quarters Quarters
1. External financing requirement –1,650 –1,806 –1,407 –1,745 –6,608 –1,768 –2,039
1.1 Current account balance –1,559 –1,815 –1,419 –1,783 –6,575 –1,705 –2,120
1.2 Capital account balance –91 9 12 38 –32 –63 81
2. Financing 4,336 194 1,605 1,005 7,140 1,635 2,441
2.1 Direct investment –194 266 20 470 562 417 275
2.1.1 Direct investment abroad –481 –158 –68 –750 –1457 –252 9
2.1.2 Direct investment in Hungary 286 423 89 1,220 2,018 669 266
2.2 Borrowing by consolidated 
general government 1,559 –289 1,236 –271 2,234 969 60
2.2.1 Borrowing from MNB –116 –541 –771 –421 –1,849 –738 –25
2.2.2 Borrowing  by Government 
(excluding securities issue) 947 –12 1146 280 2,361 923 658
2.2.3 Purchases of government 
securities by non–residents 728 264 861 –130 1722 784 –573
2.3 Net borrowing by private sector 2,927 126 251 777 4,082 106 2,010
2.3.1 Borrowing by credit institutions 2,647 –86 320 484 3,365 252 1,971
2.3.2 Portfolio investment (shares) 208 39 148 –173 223 326 98
2.3.3 Net borrowing by firms abroad 73 173 –217 465 494 –473 –58
2.4 Net errors and omissions 45 92 98 29 263 143 96
3. Change in international 
reserves (1+2) 2,686 –1,611 198 –740 532 –133 402
Composition of the financing
Per cent of GDP 
Chart 4.4
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Under the 2005 budget bill, fixed investment worth
approximately HUF 300 billion would be implemented
‘with the involvement of private capital’, under what is
called a PPP scheme, and another HUF 138 billion in
government revenue would be raised through the trans-
fer of assets into PPPs. Thus, at first sight, it seems that
the adoption of PPP schemes will earn the budget
approximately HUF 428 billion, more than 2 per cent of
GDP, in 2005.25 What follows provides an overview of
a framework of analysis and also the macro-economic
consequences of applying such schemes.
What is called public-private partnership (PPP) schemes
may be implemented in different forms, depending on
whether (1) the private sector actually performs the par-
ticular fixed investment or simply takes over an existing
asset, (2) they take the form of operating leases or con-
cessions, or the private sector also acquires ownership
title, and whether, in the latter case, the asset remains in
private ownership upon termination of the contract or it
is transferred to general government at residual value.
The starting point of an economic analysis of PPP is the
manner and extent of risk transfer distribution between
the general government and the private sector, as it pro-
vides a basis for deciding whether the relevant invest-
ment is public or private in the economic sense. In prac-
tice, a risk distribution analysis relies for the most part
on the principles of business accounting. The reason for
this is that measuring the risk borne by the private sec-
tor is of special consequence in business accounting,
thus its requirements for similar transactions (e.g. lease
agreements) may provide a suitable term of reference
for assessing whether risk is transferred in effect or only
formally.26 With respect to the budget classification
applied in the United States, the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) singles out six considerations to be used
as criteria for recognising PPP projects in the private
sector.27 In the case of fixed investment, risks are actual-
ly transferred to the private sector if
• the fixed asset serves general purposes (i.e. it is not
specified by general government),
• the fixed asset has a market also in the private sector,
• during the term of the contract, the private partner
has ownership title to the asset, which is not transferred
to the government subsequently either,
• the contract does not stipulate a bargain-price pur-
chase option,
• the contractual term does not exceed 75 per cent of
the estimated economic life of the asset;
• the present value of the minimum rent payable during
the contractual term may not exceed 90 per cent of the
fair market value at the beginning of the contractual
term.
The Eurostat requirements applicable to the EU
Member States use different considerations to establish
whether PPP projects should be recognised within gen-
eral government or not. The currently effective Eurostat
regulation, which specifies earlier considerations, exam-
ines whether
• the private sector bears the construction risk, and
• at least one of either availability or demand risk.28
If neither is the case, the PPP is considered to be a finan-
cial lease, i.e. a below-the-line transaction; thus irrespec-
tive of its legal framework, the project must be re-includ-
ed in general government accounting. According to the
4.4 PPP PROJECTS FROM A MACRO-ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
25 For further details, see the general supporting argument in the budget bill, pp. 62-63, and the two tables in the annex attached thereunto and from
among the supporting arguments for the individual chapters see the one on the major central budget revenues and, within that, page 7 of the textual sup-
porting argument. These documents are available at the Ministry of Finance website.
26 For example, approaches by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB).
27 The Budgetary Treatment of Leases and Public/Private Ventures, Congressional Budget Office, 2003.
28 Constructing risk covers notably events, such late delivery, additional costs and external negative effects. Availability risk covers problems of perform-
ance, such as problems with the quality, volume and safety standards in the provision of services. Demand risk covers variability of demand irrespective
of the behaviour of the private partner. See 18/2004 Eurostat decision.
29 See: IMF: Public investment and Fiscal Policy, March 2004.
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IMF view, this recent Eurostat decision gives consider-
ably cause for concern, because it is likely result in most
PPP projects being classified as private investment.29
From the perspective of fiscal consolidation, one of the
most conspicuous differences between a PPP scheme
and traditional public fixed investment is that the former
considerably changes the time profile of expenditures
recorded in general government. In the case of tradi-
tional public fixed investment, expenditure arises at the
beginning of the term (first fixed investment and then
operational and interest expenses), whereas under a
PPP scheme the entire expenditure is spread over time.
In consequence, though in the initial phase it results in
savings in the budget, later it incurs continuous addi-
tional expenditure.
What are the consequences of replacing traditional
public fixed investment with PPP schemes? First, in the
year of switching to the new scheme, government
expenditure is abruptly cut, as no substantial initial fixed
investment expenditure arises. Later on, however, this
may give rise to several problems. One is that the future
budget becomes less flexible. The government used to
reduce the deficit primarily by putting a brake on fixed
investment; however, under PPP schemes such expen-
diture is determined in advance.
Second, if fixed investment is outsourced to PPP
schemes, the constraints of the government budget
become less effective, because fixed investment
expansion envisaged by the government can be imple-
mented at a seemingly minimum explicit fiscal cost in
the short term. This raises considerable concerns in
terms of control, because the current deficit can be
temporarily reduced by building up a liability portfolio
relatively rapidly, thereby imposing debts payable in
the future.30
A related concern is when fiscal policy uses the one-off
deficit-reducing effect of channelling fixed investment
into PPP schemes to increase other expenditure and/or
to cut taxes, as the adoption of PPP schemes result in
only temporary and arguable savings. Despite the
reduction in the current deficit, the aggregate net pres-
ent value of future deficits hardly changes. On the con-
trary: they are more likely to increase.
Developments in the net present value depend on sev-
eral factors. With the involvement of the private sector
through PPP schemes efficiency may increase, the gains
of which, similarly to risks, may be shared by the private
partner and general government (as well as the parties
using the service). Savings earned from a permanent
rise in efficiency should, however, be able to cover cer-
tain additional costs, e.g. the higher burden of private
financing. The latter stems from the fact that the govern-
ment invariably has access to loans under more
favourable conditions than private corporations do.
Compared to traditional public fixed investment, ove-
rall, investment, operation and financing costs may be
either more or less favourable under a PPP scheme.
Practical evidence can be quoted for both, although
certain general conclusions have already been drawn
on the types of projects that can be more efficient
under a PPP framework.31 If, for instance, the underlying
reason for preference for PPP schemes involves short-
term considerations, namely the intention to temporari-
ly reduce the deficit and then risk transfer may be, in
part, formal, and the issue of efficiency is no longer a
major consideration. Thus, the total cost is likely to be
higher, rather than lower.
From a macro-economic perspective, when PPP
schemes are adopted, in addition to the above-dis-
cussed aspects of the costs of the entire period, a short-
er-term macro-economic effect can also be examined.
While the adoption of PPP schemes reduces the head-
line deficit, these projects fundamentally exert the same
effects on external equilibrium, economic growth and
inflation as traditional public fixed investment does:
they boost domestic demand and deteriorate the exter-
nal equilibrium irrespective of the framework of imple-
mentation. In other words, external equilibrium cannot
be improved by reducing general government expendi-
ture through a simultaneous increase in PPP fixed
investment. Furthermore, as mentioned above in con-
nection with the issue of control, it is conceivable that
during a gradual adoption of PPP schemes fiscal policy
uses the arguable ‘savings’ in public expenditure to
increase other current expenditure items and/or to
reduce revenues. If this is the case, owing to domestic
demand thus further boosted, the adoption of PPP
schemes may have a negative rather than neutral effect
on external equilibrium (relative to traditional public fi-
xed investment).
In conclusion, it is safe to assume that, in the short term,
PPP schemes exert the same effects on external equilib-
rium and demand as traditional public fixed investment
does. A temporary decrease in deficit, attributable the
outsourcing of fixed investment, does not improve
macro-economic stability in the short term, as no actual
adjustment is performed.
30 The State Audit Office examined the PPP schemes scheduled for 2005 from several aspects. See Vélemény a Magyar Köztársaság 2005. évi költségve-
tési javaslatáról (Opinion on the 2005 budget bill of the Republic of Hungary), ÁSz, October 2004, Chapter 4.4 (www.asz.gov.hu).
31 See IMF, Public-Private Partnerships, March 2004 (www.imf.org).
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In the first eight months of 2004 gross average wages
increased by nearly 7.0 per cent (year-on-year), which,
in view of the 7.1 per cent average inflation rate of the
period, represents a flat growth rate of gross real wages
for this year in practical terms. In 2004 H1, however,
household consumption expenditure exceeded the
year-on-year figures by more than 4.4 per cent in real
terms, while since early 2004 financial savings, almost
entirely ebbed away last year, have started to grow con-
siderably and persistently (in 2004 H1 the net financial
savings of the sector was nearly HUF 180 billion).
Having accepted the fact that the level of housing
investment was determined by last year’s develop-
ments,32 household income and expenditure develop-
ments this year present a number of problems for ana-
lysts.
Accordingly, this analysis aims to find answers to two
questions: what is the reason for the accelerating
growth of household consumption which regained mo-
mentum in H1 (i.e. can last year’s slowdown in con-
sumption turn around permanently) and to what extent
were income developments consistent with decisions
on household consumption and savings in 2004 H1.
One-off effects in household consumption 
expenditure
Developments in household consumption expenditure,
simply on account of the methodology of statistical cal-
culation, is closely correlated with changes in retail
sales. Based on this correlation, we found it useful to
examine the time series of retail sales activity categories
from the point of view whether they showed a phase-
out (e.g. a sharp increase in volatility) this year signifi-
cantly different from previous years.
Our findings drew our attention to the time series of
motor vehicles and vehicle parts, representing an item
with one of the largest weight in retail sales, with near-
ly 17 per cent based on 2003 figures. As the largest
part, more than three quarters, of this category is made
up of car sales, we then examined the sales figures of
car importers (see Chart 3). Sales of car importers grew
0.2 per cent (nearly 1.7 per cent taking account of rela-
tive prices) in the first three quarters of 2004. This
growth, however, was extremely unevenly distributed
over the three quarters. The strong decline in the first
quarter was followed by an upturn of extraordinarily
brisk pace even by historical standards in the second
quarter, which, in turn, was followed by a considerable
fall. Although the decline in household real income
growth and the gradual saturation of the car market
would lead to the slowdown of growth in car sales in
any case, the volatility we encountered could only be
due to one-off distorting effects. In our view this distor-
tion was mainly caused by the introduction and the
modification of the registration tax this year and the
uncertainty surrounding EU accession in May.
As far as new car sales are concerned, the introduction
of the registration tax this February led to the easing of
4.5 ISSUES IN HOUSEHOLDS’ BEHAVIOUR IN 2004 H1
32 We assume (and this has been confirmed by our past experience) that this year’s household investment may correlate closely with the number of res-
idential construction permits issued last year. Since both the level and the growth rate of the number of residential construction permits issued last year
increased exceptionally rapidly, we estimate buoyant household investment for this year as well. Coincident indicators received before the date of this
Report (the number of new homes, the retail turnover of furniture, building materials and other household article sales, the size of foreign currency hous-
ing loans) have also reinforced our projections.
Household consumption expenditure 
and retail sales
Seasonally adjusted quarter-on-quarter growth rate
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tax burdens practically in every category, while in the
case of used cars it prompted an increase in prices due
to taxes. Thus, the greater-than-expected decline in car
sales in early 2004 could mainly be attributed to supply
factors. According to expert information these include
the growing waiting time due to traders’ insufficient
stocks and registration problems related to the release
of cars into traffic.
The amendments to the registration tax table entering
into force in mid-May 2004 led to an increase in prices
typically in all categories with an exceptionally sharp
rise in prices of large-value cars. Thus, especially in
April, the growth of motor vehicle sales was excep-
tionally high. This was partly due to the spillover effect
of sales from the first quarter and partly to the upturn
in buying mood attributable to the expectations of
price increases. Since retail trade supply adapted mo-
re slowly to rising demand, May and June were still
characterised by buoyant growth as waiting times
remained long.
The third quarter saw a significant slowdown with the
strong negative index indicating purchases brought for-
ward again to the second quarter. In our estimate distor-
tions arising from regulation changes amounted to near-
ly HUF -11 to -13 billion in 2004 Q1, HUF 16 to 20 bil-
lion in Q2 and HUF -5 to -7 billion in Q3.
The tightening of the Sulinet scheme (government sub-
sidies for information technology sales) as of 1 July
could also have caused a further significant distortion.
Due to the spending of earlier subsidies, turnover in
June was more than three times higher than the average
sales figure registered in the first five months of 2004. In
our estimate the timing of consumers’ decisions reflect-
ing the change in government subsidies for computer
purchases led to sales amounting to HUF +2-3 billion in
2004 Q2 and nearly HUF (-2) billion in Q3.
The table below summarises the main distorting ele-
ments affecting consumption growth:
The Q2 distortion level is nearly 1 per cent of the con-
sumption expenditure of the sector at current prices,
while Q1 consumption figures could have exceeded
this amount by half of this figure without the distortions.
It must be noted, however, that consumption growth,
which already began decelerating in 2003, would have
come to a halt this year in any case even without these
distortions (the current spectacular upturn in the growth
rate would have been flat in the quarter). Nevertheless,
the increase in consumption in Q1 would have been
significantly higher than the level expected by experts33
and the extent justified by wage developments.
Sources and use of household income in 2004 H1
Net household wages in real terms are estimated to
have increased by nearly 0.4 per cent (year-on-year),
while the growth rate of social cash transfers to house-
holds was 9.4 per cent in real terms. Thus, the growth
rate of these two income items in H1 (3.7 per cent) is
significantly below the average annual growth rate of
9.5 per cent measured in the last three years.
Considering these income developments it should be
noted that the consumption expenditure of the sector
itself grew by more than 4.4 per cent over this period.
If, however, we take into account that households’ net
financial savings reached nearly HUF 180 billion in Q1
and Q2 (the same figure was HUF 130 billion in 2002
and HUF -80 billion in 2003) and that capital expendi-
ture presumably continued to increase rapidly,34 a defi-
nite difference can be seen between the expenditure
and the income side developments affecting house-
holds’ behaviour.
Sales by motor vehicle importers*
Seasonally adjusted quarter-on-quarter growth rate
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Source: (volume) Association of Hungarian Motor Vehicle Importers,
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Our estimates for distortion effects 
on household consumption growth
Table 4.12
2004 Q1 2004 Q2 2004 Q3
Regulation changes HUF -11 HUF 16 to HUF -5 to 
relating to car sales to -13 billion 20 billion -7 billion
Changes to the terms HUF 2 to HUF -2 
of the Sulinet scheme 3 billion billion
Total HUF -11 to HUF 18 to HUF -7 to 
-13 billion 23 billion -9 billion
33 The average annual growth rate of household consumption expenditure in 2004 measured by the surveys of Consensus Economics in 2004 H1 amount-
ed to between 2.7 and 2.9 per cent.
34 Owing to a strong pick-up in subsidised lending in 2003, the number of new home completions in the first nine months this year was 45 per cent high-
er than a year earlier. Although this increase was, in part, the result of base effects (e.g. unfavourable weather conditions in 2003 H1), owner occupation
in 2004 may be close to 20 per cent higher than the historically already high value (the highest in the period after the political regime change) in 2003.
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In our view, the tension between the revenue and
expenditure sides of the balance sheet of households’
income can only be eased by the faster-than-expected
growth rate of households’ ‘other’ income. This income
category accounts for nearly 30 per cent of households’
disposable income comprising mainly property income
(interest, dividends, rent) and households’ profits from
self-employed business activities (mixed income).
In our estimate, affected by the increase of the real inte-
rest rates in 2003 H2, households’ net interest revenues
exceeded the year-on-year amount by nearly HUF 90 bil-
lion in 2004 H1. At the same time, due to the positive
developments at the Budapest Stock Exchange this year,
exchange rate gains on the sector’s investments in
shares exceeded HUF 35 billion (HUF 1.6 billion year-
on-year). Thus households’ income from interests and
exchange rate gains at the stock exchange could exceed
the year-on-year amount by nearly HUF 125 billion.
The increase in property income noted above may have
been further expanded by so-called “mixed” income
through self-employment. Based on 2002 figures, more
than 14 per cent of this income was generated in con-
struction, which, taking into account the buoyant activ-
ity in the housing market still continuing this year, sug-
gests a significant household value added even for 2004
H1. Within the category of other income, the sector of
real estate, renting and business activities with a similar
weight of nearly 25 per cent incorporating intellectual
activities with large value added but with relatively low
expenditure (business and legal advisory services, sale
of real estate, information technology, etc.) may also
have contributed positively to the developments of
mixed income in 2004.
Significant favourable effects are also likely to have affect-
ed households’ other income through the government
budget this year. With Hungary’s accession to the EU,
Hungarian agricultural producers will be entitled to land-
based agricultural EU subsidies, to be supplemented by
the Hungarian government, from 2005. Agricultural pro-
ducers have had access to part of these subsidy funds
already this year. With eligibility criteria remaining
unchanged in 2004, tax refunds on subsidised housing
loans extended last year, with their amount practically
doubling compared to a year earlier, were a source of
additional household income. (It should be noted that
only part of such refunds is likely to have influenced
households’ decisions on consumption and savings in
2004, as interim tax payments during the reference peri-
od can be credited to such refunds.)
The introduction of EVA (a simplified business tax
regime) in 2003 is also likely to have caused a positive
Households’ income from interests and
exchange rate gains at the stock exchange*
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Size of quantifiable effects on other households
income
HUF billions
Table 4.13
2003 2004
Nominal (net) interest 
income* 88.8 212.3
EU agricultural 
subsidies ** - 74.6
Tax refunds on 
housing loans 17.3 31.2
Total 106.1 318.1
* An MNB estimate; interest income and expenses also comprise in-
terest compensation for inflation.
** In calculating the distribution of agricultural subsidies we relied on
the distribution data based on the forms of farming included in CSO’s
most recent statistics on cultivated arable land (sole proprietors 58.2
per cent).
Households’ other income
Annual growth in real terms
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income shock, with part of the indirect tax revenues
materialising as household and private sector income.
Our assumption is based on data suggesting an increas-
ingly large gap between VAT revenues (adjusted with
EVA) and the rate of consumption growth.
Summing up the above effects on income and uses,
households’ decisions on consumption and savings in
2004 can be financed only through an increase in
other income that exceeds the historical average
markedly. Quantifiable income, which we deem to be
the most important, may easily exceed last year’s
income from a similar source by approximately HUF
212 billion. Given the favourable developments in the
securities market and income materialising in an
increasingly simple business tax regime (see EVA) as
additional factors, this is likely to have led to a more
active consumption and saving behaviour than previ-
ously expected.
Chart 4.8 shows our estimate for aggregate other
income. Finally, it should also be added that, against a
backdrop of higher-than-expected income, the sector’s
propensity to consume, following a peak in early 2003,
has hardly become more subdued, and is still very high
in comparison with other EU Member States.
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Money markets are continuously affected by impacts
from a number of sources. The exchange rate of the fo-
rint and yields on Hungarian government securities are
shaped by the combined effect of news on the
Hungarian economy, international money and capital
market developments and regional influences.
Economic analysts often attempt to explain or forecast
money market developments based on macroeconom-
ic events as investors playing a role in defining
exchange rates attribute great importance to the state
of the economy in a given country when making invest-
ment decisions. Improving or deteriorating fundamen-
tals can significantly contribute to the strengthening or
weakening of investors’ confidence in a country’s cur-
rency, government securities and other investment
opportunities. It is essentially this confidence that deter-
mines the price (the exchange rate and interest rate) at
which investors are willing to invest in a country.
Investors pay close attention to figures on the state of
the economy and a new piece of information may
prompt them to revise their former view, and to reallo-
cate their portfolio, thus also affecting the value of the
domestic currency and yields on government securities.
Our recent study35 examined the effects of the publica-
tion of the most significant economic data (the con-
sumer price index, the industrial producer price index,
the growth rate of domestic gross product (GDP), the
current account balance, industrial output growth, the
unemployment rate and the public sector deficit) on the
market. In addition to these seven categories of data, the
effects of the publication of the Report on Inflation pub-
lished by the MNB and Reuters poll of analysts were also
included in our study. Where possible we looked for a
correlation between the deviation from analysts’ expec-
tations (i.e. the surprise value) and the effect of the news
on money markets. The results were further refined by
the use of exchange rate figures of larger (two minute)
frequency and by the elimination of outliers.
Our findings derived from Hungarian data confirm inter-
national experience. The size of the announced data has
only a limited effect on money markets: it is the devia-
tion of figures from expectations, i.e. the surprise value
of information, that has a major impact on the markets.
The reason for this is that the expectations of new data
and the information derived from them are continuous-
ly built in market prices and exchange rates. Thus, at the
time of the next release of data it is the unexpected part
of the data (the surprise) that has an effect on the
exchange rate and yields. The impact of new pieces of
information could only be shown clearly when the brevi-
Characteristics of the data under review
Table 4.14
Announcement Number of announced Frequency of Release time Published by
data in the period announcement
Consumer price index 31 Monthly 9:00 CSO
Industrial producer price index 30 Monthly 9:00 CSO
GDP 10 Quarterly 9:00 CSO
Current account balance 30 Monthly 8:30 MNB
Industrial output 31 Monthly 9:00 CSO
Unemployment rate 31 Monthly 9:00 CSO
Public sector deficit 31 Monthly Varied Min. of Finance
Report on Inflation 10 Quarterly 14:00 MNB
Reuters regular poll 31 Monthly Varied Reuters
Reuters one-off poll 15 Varied Varied Reuters
4.6 HOW DOES MACROECONOMIC NEWS AFFECT MONEY MARKETS?
35 Norbert Kiss M.: The Effects of Macroeconomic News on Money Markets, MNB Occasional Papers 30 (2004).
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ty of the period chosen allowed for the elimination of
other effects and no other events influenced the change,
in part also related to the brevity of the period. Based on
our experience the economic data under review can be
divided into well-defined categories.
Data having the largest impact on money markets:
inflation, GDP, current account balance
The first category includes the consumer price index,
the growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) and
the current account balance, all having a clear impact
on money markets. In most cases, announcement of
these data caused a significantly larger shift in the
exchange rate of the forint and yields on government
securities than the shifts recorded on non-announce-
ment days. While money markets are clearly more sen-
sitive to these announcements, the change in exchange
rates and yields correlate mainly with the unexpected
part of the data. This means that as far as money mar-
ket developments are concerned, it is the deviation of
the data from analysts’ published expectations that is of
key importance, as opposed to the absolute size of the
data. In the case of these three categories of data, both
the direction and the extent of the deviation from
expectations have a clear impact on the direction and
the extent of exchange rate and yield movements.
In the case of the exchange rate, the effect of the new
piece of information can only be detected over a short
period of time, mainly in the few hours following the
announcement. When examining this effect over a one-
day time horizon, the correlation was not clearly
detectable from a statistical point of view. The effect
ceased: the exchange rate returned to the level justified
by the general state of the economy, the extent of the
external and internal imbalances and the regional and
international market trends of the period. When we
eliminated those days from our sample on which the
exchange rate was affected by important events in addi-
tion to an announcement of data, the correlation was
clear even if daily changes were taken into account.
Our findings suggest that in a significant part of the peri-
od under review (especially in the course of 2002) mar-
kets considered the MNB’s attempts to maintain strong
exchange rate levels in order to achieve low inflation
credible. It is very likely, that exchange rate expecta-
tions were orientated by this market view and as a result
economic data only had a short impact on the
exchange rate of the forint.
The publication of new data regarding the state of the
economy had a more permanent effect on the yield on
long-term government securities with maturities of over
one year, which are of key importance from the point
of view of the budget’s interest expense. The correla-
tion was also shown in the case of changes over one
day. The close correlation was not significantly modified
by the elimination of outliers from the sample either.
The impact on the yields on long-term government
securities is stronger than the average value: while the
correlation with the unexpected part of the data was
closer, the same extent of surprise caused a greater
change in the yields on long-term securities than in the
yields on short-term government securities.
The difference between the effects of a new piece of
information on the exchange rate of the forint and on
the yields on long-term government securities is well
illustrated by the developments following the publica-
tion of the current account balance of October 2003 on
12 December 2003. With announcement of the signifi-
cantly worse-than-expected figures, the exchange rate
of the forint started to fall sharply, but was adjusted in a
few hours’ time and reached a similar level as it had
been at before the announcement. In the case of 5-year
yields this effect was slower, but more permanent: high-
er yields were sustained and even increased further
over the period of one day.
Despite the evident impact the announcement of new
data has, it seems that the publication of a certain figure
in itself only has a temporary and restricted effect on
the exchange rate and on yields. A permanent shift only
takes place if the market’s assessment of the general
state of the economy changes due to several categories
of data reinforcing each other and the new situation
prompts market participants to revise their expectations
regarding the central bank’s reactions.
Data not having an evident impact on money markets:
industrial output and public sector deficit
The second group includes industrial output and public
sector deficit. Here we found no statistically evident
correlation with the surprise element of the new piece
Exchange rate and 5-year yield movements over
one day on 12 December 2003
Current account balance figures: EUR -469, market expectation:
EUR -300
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of information. This could be due to the fact that pieces
of information on budget developments are published
continuously and frequently between the date of ana-
lysts’ surveys and the publication of data (e.g. the
monthly projections of the Ministry of Finance and fre-
quent pieces of news on different government meas-
ures regarding the budget). Thus, the effect of the new
piece of information cannot be felt in a concentrated
manner at the time of the publication. As far as industri-
al output is concerned, analysts’ forecasts deviate from
the actual results in most cases. It is therefore possible
that expectations play no special role, and as a result,
there is no correlation.
In the case of other categories of data (the industrial
producer price index, the unemployment rate, etc.) the
announcement of the data itself did not have a clear
impact on the exchange rate and yields and as we had
no analysts’ expectations for these categories, it was
not possible to examine the deviations from expecta-
tions.
On the whole we may conclude that the state of the
Hungarian economy and the international and regional
market developments are equally reflected by changes
in the forint exchange rate and in the market of govern-
ment securities yields. Recently, data regarding the eco-
nomic growth rate, inflation and the current account
balance have had a significant effect on money and for-
eign currency markets. While the impact of economic
figures on the exchange rate has proven to be tempo-
rary in most cases, long-term yields on government
securities have permanently increased due to the uncer-
tainty surrounding economic imbalances.
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4.7.1 HOW DO BANKS’ INTEREST RATES REACT TO
MARKET YIELD MOVEMENTS?
The extent to which a central bank can influence yields
and interest rates (most notably commercial banks’ inte-
rest rates playing a decisive role in financial intermedia-
tion) relevant for market participants is key to the oper-
ation of the interest rate channel, one of the most
important channels of the monetary transmission
process.
The interest rate channel has an effect on investment
and consumption through three mechanisms. First, the
reaction of corporations and households to interest rate
movements is dependent on the extent of the substitu-
tion effect (i.e. changes in the opportunity costs of other
savings and expenditure items) caused by interest rate
movements in real terms. Second, changes in the inte-
rest rate influence the interest expenses and revenues
of market participants, i.e. their net financial income
(income effect). And finally, interest rate movements
have an impact on the market value of real and finan-
cial assets, and through this, on market participants’
assets (asset effect). The degree of the income and sub-
stitution effects is largely dependent on how quickly
and to what extent banks’ interest rates react to the
changes in the central bank base rate.
This question is examined in our recent paper (MNB
Working Papers 2004/8 Csilla Horváth – Judit Krekó –
Anna Naszódi: Interest rate pass-through in Hungary)
analysing the speed and extent at which short-term mar-
ket yields passed through to commercial banks’ forint
loan and deposit interest rates in the period between
1997 and 2004. Since the results suggest that, owing to
the arbitrage opportunities between central bank and
market assets, the transmission between the central
bank interest rate and short-term market yields is fast and
effective, our findings regarding inter-bank interest rates
are also relevant in the case of central bank measures.
Based on our econometric analysis, we found that there
was a clear difference between the pricing of corporate
and household interest rates: the extent of long-term
adjustment to corporate loans and deposits was greater
and the speed of adjustment was faster than in the case
of the household sector. A complete and straightfor-
ward pass-through only takes place in the case of short-
term corporate loans, while as far as other instruments
are concerned, the adjustment is far from complete
even in the long term. As regards the speed of adjust-
ment, the consumer loan rates incorporating an extraor-
dinarily high spread, however, show strikingly incom-
plete repricing behaviour. This indicates that house-
holds’ demand for loans is not sensitive to interest rates.
Regarding short-term corporate loans, analyses of
European countries show that long-term adjustment is
nearly 100 per cent or even greater in most cases,
although studies on France, Austria and Germany stat-
ed that short-term loan interest rates are far from com-
plete even in the long term. In the case of short-term
adjustment, the changes in forint loan rates can be
regarded quite rapid. According to the most recent
studies prepared by the ECB on the whole of the euro
area,36 the adjustment was maximum 50 per cent in the
first phase, while our analysis put this figure around
60–80 per cent.
Regarding deposit rates and household loan rates the
number of studies is much lower, but the findings often
showed that in the case of these rates the adjustment
was only 40-70 per cent even in the long term (e.g. de
Bondt, 2002). Despite this, forint-denominated con-
sumer loans seem sticky even by international stan-
dards.
We examined potential non-linearities of banks’ pricing
behaviour with the help of TAR (threshold) models
based on aggregate and individual bank data. Our aim
was to establish whether the reaction of banks’ rates
4.7 INTEREST RATE PASS-THROUGH IN HUNGARY
36 De Bondt (2002): Retail bank interest rate pass-through: new evidence at the euro area level, ECB Working Paper No. 136.
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varied according to the different size, sign or volatility of
yield movements. The results suggest that the adjust-
ment of bank rates depends on the extent of the devia-
tion from the equilibrium value and on the extent of the
yield movement. We found the adjustment to be signif-
icantly faster for changes above a threshold level, which
could be explained by the presence of menu costs.
The sign of yield shocks also turned out to be influential
to the speed of adjustment. In line with international
experience, we found that corporate loan rates were
characterised by downward rigidity. Loan rates are
expected to be rigid downward, while deposit rates tend
to be rigid upward, in accordance with the profit maximi-
sation behaviour of banks, trying to make use of the rigid-
ity of the demand for loans and the supply of deposits.
Taking into account, however, the sharp competition in
the corporate loan segment among banks, our findings
are somewhat surprisingly similar to our other finding that
household deposits react to a rise in yields faster than to
their fall. Our results could be explained by the fact that
on average the extent of the rise in yields was larger than
the fall in yields. We attempted to measure how the
volatility of yields affected the interest rate pass-through.
In our estimates, however, we could not separate the
effect of a higher yield volatility on expectations from the
effect of larger yield movements implying faster adjust-
ment. Our results showed that one or both of the param-
eters determining the speed of adjustment grew signifi-
cantly when the yield volatility exceeded a certain level.
In our view this could be explained by the fact that in
periods of higher yield volatility the size of the yield
shocks was much larger and this effect was stronger than
the effect of higher interest rate uncertainty slowing
down repricing. Nevertheless, in periods of volatility
(mainly in 2003), the faster adjustment of bank rates
could not counterbalance the effect of higher yield
shocks reflected by the higher volatility of spreads.
4.7.2 FUTURE TRENDS
As noted above, competition in the corporate sector
is relatively strong. The adjustment of loan rates was
relatively fast and sizeable suggesting a low spread
between the average loan rates and the market yields.
As far as corporate loan rates are concerned, we can-
not foresee a dramatic increase, while in the case of
corporate deposit rates, and in particular in the
household sector, a stronger adjustment can be
expected.
On the deposit side, the transmission process could be
improved if structural excess liquidity was absorbed as
in this case banks would rely on deposit funds to an
even greater extent than at present. Regarding house-
hold loans, we assume a decline in the exceptionally
high level of the consumer loan spread in line with a
greater impact of market rates on the pricing of these
loans. As the majority of real estate loans are comprised
of subsidised loans and, until very recently, fixed inte-
rest rate loans, changes in the central bank rates had no
effect on this sector whatsoever. Due to the December
2003 reform of the subsidy system the maximum
amount of client loans was defined as a percentage of
market yields of similar maturity as opposed to a fix
amount used in the past. As a result, the pass-through is
expected to have a greater effect on subsidised housing
loans. It should be noted, however, that foreign curren-
cy market-based loans account for an increasingly large
share in the housing loan market having an impact in
the opposite direction.
The lengthening of loan maturities in line with the
decline in inflation and interest rate uncertainty may
also weaken the interest rate transmission between the
central bank base rate attached to short-term instru-
ments and the average loan rates.
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The interest payments on the government debt over a
given period are based on the interest burden of the
fixed-rate debt issued earlier, and of the debt to be
issued in the period under review. While the first part of
the interest payments is exactly known, the second
depends on the following:
• Debt redemption and the deficit. Among the ele-
ments of the gross financing requirement the amount of
the redemption and renewable debt is known, while the
amount of the deficit to be financed is uncertain. If the
deficit exceeds the planned level, the debt and its inte-
rest burden will also be higher than projected.
• The composition of gross financing according to the
expected foreign currency and maturity structure.
• Yield movements. The interest burden of a newly
issued fixed-rate debt will be determined by the market
at the auctions. Interest rate payments on variable rate
bonds are also influenced by yield movements.
According to the appropriation laid down in the 2004
Budget Act, the cash flow-based interest expenses will
amount to HUF 753 billion with a GDP ratio of 3.7 per
cent. Based on the current projections of the central
bank, however, the amount of cash flow-based expens-
es is expected to reach HUF 884 billion with a GDP
ratio of 4.3 per cent. Hence, the expected value of the
interest expenditures will therefore exceed the appro-
priation of the Budget Act by 0.6 per cent of GDP. The
difference is exceptionally high if we take into account
that a significant part of the interest payments for 2004
was already known at the time of the planning.37 The
deviation from the estimate is mainly due to interest
payments on treasury bills and bonds. In the case of
treasury bills the expected interest expenses exceed the
estimate by 0.25 per cent of GDP, while in the case of
bonds this percentage is 0.3 per cent.
The reasons for the difference between the appropria-
tion and the actual forecast can be divided into two
groups. The first group includes planning errors where
the assumptions regarding the above factors were not
plausible and the estimated developments were not in
line with the expected path on the basis of all the avail-
able information at the time of the planning. The second
group covers reasons explaining that economic devel-
opments deviated from the best estimate incorporating
all the available information at the time of the planning.
In the first group, the projection was based on a signifi-
cantly lower primary deficit estimate for 2003 than
could have been expected at the time of the planning.
Another planning error was that the forecast assumed a
lower yield curve than the market yield curve at the
time. The latter incorporates all the information and
expectations of the market and thus the projection on
expected yields is only prudent if it is based on the mar-
ket yield curve.
4.8 WHY ARE CASH FLOW-BASED INTEREST EXPENDITURES
OF THE GOVERNMENT BUDGET FOR 2004 EXPECTED TO EXCEED
THE AMOUNT LAID DOWN IN THE BUDGET ACT?
37 The closer the planning period to the time of the planning, the higher the weight of the already defined and known interest expenses within the total
amount of interest expenses. The 2003 budget was planned in August and September 2003. Based on our calculations, the interest burden for 2004 on
the above mentioned instruments, already known as facts at the time of the planning, was HUF 540 billion on 31 August 2003. The relative deviation
from the planned amount is therefore even larger, as ‘uncertain’ interest expenses amounted to HUF 344 billion as opposed to HUF 213 billion.
The budget estimate for the cash flow-based interest revenue and expenses of the government budget
for 2004 and the current projections of the central bank
Table 4.15
Interest revenue Interest expenditure Interest  balance
Billion HUF In percent Billion HUF In percent Billion HUF In percent of 
of GDP (%) of GDP (%) of GDP (%)
Budget Act 2004. (Appropriation) 63 0.3 753 3.7 690 3.4
Forecast of the MNB 65 0.3 884 4.3 819 4.0
Difference 2 0.0 131 0.6 129 0.6
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The second group explaining deviation includes the fact
that the ratio of foreign currency financing grew signifi-
cantly faster than planned earlier. In addition, yields
have risen and have been higher in 2004 so far, than
could have been expected based on the market yield
curve at the time of the planning, making the financing
of the deficit and the due debt more expensive.
Based on the budget’s financing plan for 2004 and the
actual and planned financing structure and assuming
different yield curves, we may attempt to define to what
extent the factors above explain the difference between
the statutory and the expected value of net interest
expenses.
The September 2003 modification of the 2003 and
2004 financing plans and the market yield curve of 29
August 2003, reflecting the yield expectations of market
participants, are in line with interest expenses of HUF
803 billion. The Act, therefore, due to underestimation
of the expected yields, projected the GFS-based net in-
terest expenses at HUF 53 billion (GDP ratio of 0.26
percent) less than it should have taking into account the
market yield curve containing all pieces of information.
The projection is not very sensitive to which yield curve
of the planning period is used. If the projection was to
be based on the lowest yield curve for the period of
August and September (26 September) or on the high-
est (4 August), this would decrease the estimated inte-
rest expenses by only HUF 5 billion and HUF 3 billion,
respectively.
This calculation, however, does not reflect the fact that
the deficit without interest expenses was higher than
estimated for 2003, although this could have been fore-
seen in the light of earlier fiscal developments. It neither
includes the fact that the deficit is expected to exceed
the original estimate in 2004 as well. Excess debts
financing a higher deficit than estimated for 2003 and
2004 increased interest expenses for 2004 by nearly
HUF 25 billion. According to our calculations, there-
fore, based on the actual deficit, the original financing
structure and the market yield curve of 29 August 2003,
HUF 828 billion should have been estimated for interest
expenses. Out of the budget’s interest expenses
exceeding the estimate, HUF 78 billion (60 per cent of
the total deviation) could be explained by the underes-
timation of the deficit and yields.
Compared to the financing plan used for the interest
balance of the government budget, the Government
Debt Management Agency has issued EUR 1 billion mo-
re foreign currency bonds this year. 2004 foreign cur-
rency bonds no longer pay interest this year. If these
funds were to be deducted in HUF by the Government
Debt Management Agency, this would have increased
interest expenses by nearly HUF 15 billion (with a GDP
ratio of 0.07 per cent) assuming an average forint
financing structure.
In 2004, due to the broken equilibrium of economic
developments and the increase in risks related to the
euro adoption rate, yields of all maturities have been
significantly higher, than could have been expected on
the basis of the market yield curve in the planning peri-
od of the 2004 budget. According to our calculations,
the effect of rising market yields on the interest balance
is around HUF 67 billion, assuming the originally
planned financing structure.
Based on the above calculations, therefore, the major
part of the deviations of the expected cash flow-based
interest expenses from the estimate can be attributed to
the expected yield movements and the underestimation
of the deficit amounting to a 0.38 percentage point from
the total GDP ratio of 0.63 percentage points. The rise
in market yield added another 0.32 percentage point to
the expected amount of interest expenses, while it was
decreased by 0.07 percentage points due to the
increase in the weight of foreign currency financing.
When planning the budget for 2005, the Ministry of
Finance used its own yield curve forecast, similarly to
last year. Based on our calculations this method once
again predicts that interest expenses will be nearly HUF
60-70 billion lower, than would have been projected as
the expected value of interest expenses based on the
market yield curve.
Factors affecting net interest expenses of the government budget
Table 4.16
The components of the difference between the appropriation and the actual forecast: 
HUF billions In percent Contribution to the 
of GDP (%) difference (per cent)
Interest expenditure appropriation 753 3.67
Underestimation of yields 53 0.26 41
Higher deficit 25 0.12 19
Higher foreign currency debt issuance -15 -0.07 -12
Rising yields 67 0.32 51
Expected interest expenditure 885 4.31
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